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Discriminatory Housing Markets, Racial
Unconscionability, and Section 1988:
The Contract Buyers League Case
In the spring of 1968, the Supreme Court revived Section 1 of the
1866 Civil Rights Act from a century of quiescence:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.1
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.2 interpreted these words to prohibit "all
racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property."3
A year later the Northern District of Illinois gave force to Section
1982 in a lawsuit radically different from Jones v. Mayer. In a class
action,4 a number of blacks who purchased used homes in the ghettos
and changing neighborhoods of Chicago sued their sellers in federal
court for "overcharging" 5 them because of their race, asking in the alter-
1. As codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
2. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
3. Id. at 413 (emphasis in original). In that case a real estate developer's refusal to sell
a home to a black on the basis of his race was declared illegal. As relief the black plahitilf
was entitled to obtain an injunction directing the developer to carry through with the
transaction. Id. at 414 nn. 13, 14.
4. The plaintiff class was composed of all blacks who had purchased residential
property in the city of Chicago since January 1, 1952, a date arbitrarily set by the court, on
installment contracts from the named defendant-sellers. The sellers numbered several
dozen and the buyers an estimated 3,000. Brief for Appellees at 3, Baker v. F & F Invest-
ment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970). The district court's decision holding the suit to be a
proper class action under FEn. R. CIv. PRoc. 23(b)(3) is reported as Contract Buyers League
v. F & F Investment, 1969 Trade Cas. 72,754 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
5. The Contract Buyers League organization uses the following example to illustrate
the injustice committed against its members:
The heart of our story is that real estate speculators have made unjust profits in
selling us homes. For example, on September 23, 1960, a typical real estate
speculator, taking advantage of residential racial segregation and the admitted dis-
criminatory policies of the Federal Housing Administration, banks and savings
and loan institutions, purchased a residence from a panicked white family for
$14,000 and sold it three days later to Mr. and Mrs. Howell Collins, a black couple
for $25,500. The speculator had paid $2,000 down and obtained a mortgage for
$12,000. Mr. and Mrs. Collins paid $1,500 down to the speculator and signed a con.
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native for rescission or reformation of the contracts, plus actual and
punitive damages. In this case, Contract Buyers League v. F - F Invest-
ment,6 Judge Hubert L. Will found, in ruling on the defendant-sellers'
motion to dismiss, that the plaintiff-buyers stated a claim under Section
1982.7
Relying heavily on the new life given the 1866 Civil Rights Act by
Jones v. Mayer, Judge Will said that the defendant-sellers would have
violated Section 1982 if it were proven at trial that they sold property
to blacks at higher prices than similar property was or would have been
sold to whites.8 He conceded the sweeping implications of his interpreta-
tion:
Defendants contend that this holding would mean that 'every non-
white citizen has a cause of action maintainable in Federal Court
to either rescind or reform each and every transaction involving a
purchase or leasing of either real or personal property by the simple
allegation that he was charged more than a white person would
have been charged or that he received less favorable terms and con-
ditions than would have been given to a white person.'
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, and considering that any
such allegation would be subject, as any allegation, to the test of
proof on trial, defendants are correct.9
tract calling for monthly installments of $226 because mortgages were not available
to black people.
Under the contract, Mr. and Mrs. Collins will pay a total of $44,820. With a
mortgage and fair price of $15,000, the appraised value of the building, they would
have paid only $20,740-a difference or "race tax" of $23,980. Moreover, the), would
have made their final payment in October, 1968; but, with a perfect pamaent record,
Mr. and Mrs. Collins had a contract balance of $17,800 on October 1, 1968.
Press Statement of the Contract Buyers League Concerning the Threatened Eviction of
354 Black Families, Nov. 12, 1969.
6. 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as Contract Buyers League].
The suit is now progressing as Baker v. F & F Investment, filed as No. 69 C 15 on Jan. 6,
1969. Pursuant to Judge Will's dedsion to dismiss the organization "Contract Buyers
League" as a plaintiff, 300 F. Supp. at 230-32, the heading presently carries the name of
the League chairman, a plaintiff-buyer.
A companion suit instigated by other members of the League, buyers of nev' homes, is
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., No. 69 C 115 (N.D. Ill, filed Jan. 20, 1969). Judge
Will decided that Clark stated a § 1982 claim as well, without any written opinion beyond
the decision applied in Baker. With trials yet to come, Clark has been reassigned to Judge
Perry and Baker to Judge McGarr.
7. 300 F. Supp. at 214-16. The court also found claims stated under federal (Sherman
Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1914)) and state (Illinois Antitrust Laws, ILL. REV. STAT. 1967, ch.
38, § 60-3(1) [9]) antitrust statutes. It dismissed counts based on federal securities law
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78[aa] (1964)) and the Illinois law of
fraud, unconscionability, usury, and breach of implied warranty. The usury claim was
filed under ILL. REV. STAT. 1967, ch. 74, § 5. All the other commercial actions were al-
leged under the common law of the state of Illinois. 300 F. Supp. at 216-18, 223-29.
8. 300 F. Supp. at 215-16.
9. Id. at 215-16 (emphasis in original).
Another suit, almost identical to Contract Buyers League, has been initiated in Balti-
more. Montebello Community Ass'n v. Goldseker, Civil No. 21552-T (D. Md., filed Dec. 22,
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This Note will explore the issues raised by the Contract Buyers
League case. After a description of the interplay between the racial and
economic problems involved in the case, Judge Will's attempt to make
the sellers' alleged conduct fit the traditional definition of discrimina.
tory action under Section 1982 will be criticized. The Note will then
analyze the possibility of remedies against those who cause racial eco-
nomic inequalities by restricting the entry of blacks into a white market.
The sellers' liability, arising from the broad claim that they took advan-
tage of the buyers' unequal bargaining position as blacks in order to
impose oppressive prices and conditions, rests on the commercial law
principle of unconscionability. This principle, it is argued, can be im-
ported through Section 1988 (a companion to Section 1982) to reach the
sellers' activity. Finally, the Note will consider the implications of
Section 1982 as a mandate for federal courts to correct the entire plie-
nomenon of racial discrimination in the disposition of property.
I. The Economics of a Dual Housing Market
The Contract Buyers League complaint itself describes the historical
formation and present effect of Chicago's dual housing market.10 Resi-
1969). In an unreported decision dated Sept. 23, 1970, denying a motion to dismiss, Judge
Roszel C. Thomsen said only:
Although this case is quite different from Jones v. Mayer Co., and this Court does
not agree with all of the reasoning in Contract Buyers League, this Court, in the
present state of the authorities, is of the opinion that if plaintiffs are able to prove
all of the facts alleged, they may well be entitled to some relief under 42 U.S.C. 1982
or 1983.
Opinion at 3-4.
Hopes (and fears) have been expressed that after the Contract Buyers League dedsion
the 1866 Civil Rights Act will begin to be used to authorize extensive judilal relief for
millions of black consumers. The U.S. Justice Department filed an amicus curiae brief
during Judge Will's consideration of the motions to dismiss in Contract Buyers League,
the first of its kind to be submitted at the trial level. A New York Times interview with
Jerris Leonard, chief of the department's civil rights division, quoted him as saying "anybody
who rakes off a profit based on racial discrimination should have to pay it back," evincing
interest on the part of the Nixon administration in supporting § 1982 lawsuits by black
consumers to retrieve millions of dollars lost through discrimination in pricin. Graham,
U.S. Backs Negro Suit to Recoup 'Blockbusting' Profit in Chicago, The New 7rork Times,
March 29, 1969, at 1, col. S. See also Kohlmeier, Nixon Bid to Aid Blacks: Negroes Coll1d
Sue Home Dealers, Stores for Sales Bias Under Plan. The Wall Street Journal, Mard 81,
1969, at 26, col. 1. On the "fear" side, a group called the Real Estate Investors Association
declared the rightness of the contract seller's practices in an advertisement placed In the
Chicago Catholic Archdiocesan newspaper. Will All Chicago-Area Small Businessmen be
Subjected to this Same Shameful Harassment? (paid advertisement), The New World,
Nov. 1, 1968, at 9.
10. Filed as No. 69 C 15, Jan. 6, 1969, in the Northern District of Illinois [hereinafter
referred to as Contract Buyers League complaint]. An abbreviated version of the civil
rights count, but containing all the allegations referred to herein, is reprinted in S. PLAGt,
NEw APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY (Social Justice through Law Series) 112-25(1970). As Judge Will for purposes of the motion to dismiss took the facts alleged In the
Contract Buyers League complaint to be true, so will this Note. The type of Injustices
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dential segregation was created and sustained in Chicago and its suburbs
by real estate selling and lending practices such as the use of restrictive
covenants; refusals by white homeowners, developers and realtors to sell
to blacks; refusals by banks and savings and loan associations to lend to
blacks wishing to buy in white areas; and the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration's (FHA) practices which, in effect, made loan insurance
for blacks unavailable in white or changing neighborhoods. These
barriers prevented black entry into the white market and artificially
restricted the supply of housing and financing for blacks.
In the limited, crowded section of the market where blacks could
purchase homes, sellers were able to obtain high prices and stringent
conditions of sale for dilapidated housing, an inferior deal compared
with that available to a white man of similar buying power in the white
market. Since blacks were unable to obtain conventional or FHA-in-
sured loans, the sellers on the black side of the market doubled as finan-
ciers; they were able to charge inflated interest rates and insist on
executing installment land sale contracts, under which buyers build up
complained of by the Contract Buyers League plaintiffs have been repeatedly recognized
in scholarly and popular literature as well as in government reports and *udicial decisions.
One of the landmark scholarly studies is L. LuAu.ENT, PnoprrrY 11ALUES ANo RACE
48-65, 132, 137, 196-202 (1960) which refuted the myth that entry of blacks into white
neighborhoods causes prices to fall and presents considerable evidence of rising prices
in changing areas. Other recent, detailed Chicago studies include 0. DUNCAN & B.
DUNCAN, THE NEGRO POPULATION OF CHICAGO 77-85 (1957); 0. DuNCAN & P. HAUsEn,
HOUSING A AIETROPOLIS-CHCAGO 190-200 (1960); P. DEVISE, Cic,co's WIDENC CoLoR GAP
88-89 (1967); and R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BIno"as 4-14
(1969). Joseph A. Nowicki, International President of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers,
inspected some 900 properties, many involved in the Contract Buyers League lawsuits
Nowicki, Appraising in the Ghetto, THE REAL ESTATE API'mAISER 5-9 (Sept.-Oct., 199.
Thomas Todd, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, explained
how his office (see note 9 supra) scrutinized ghetto real estate practices in The National
Industrial Conference Board, The Urban Dilemma: Seven Steps toward Resolution 23-SO
(Public Affairs Conference Report No. 7, 1969). For legal periodical commentary,
see Satter, Land Contract Sales in Chicago: Security Turned Exploitation, 39 Clu.
BAR RECORD 262 (1958). For theoretical treatments of the mechanism of price discrimina-
tion, see G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 56.62, 126-29 (1957); and
C. STicLER, THE TrEoRy OF PRICE 209-14 (3d ed. 1966).
For popular pieces "exposing" the practices of the dual real estate market see the fol-
lowing: Norris Vitchek as told to Alfred Balk, Confessions of a Block-Buster, Tim SArTn-
DAY EVENING POST 15 (July 14,1962); Discrimination in Housing: How It Hurts the Economy,
NEvsWEE.K 62 (Sept. 3, 1962); Marciniak, Breaking the Housing Barrier, CosrO.N%,EAL 583
(March 1, 1963); Downie & Hoagland, Mortgaging the Ghetto, The Washington Post, Jan.
5 to Jan. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 1-2 (series).
Government reports include: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY Comt*.% on CIVn
DISORDERS (Kerner Report) 467-73 (1968); REPORT OF THE U.S. CO ftN_ ON CIVIL Riorrs,
343-80 (1959) and THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE ON URDAN HOUSING, A
DECENT HoME 42-43 (1968). The President's Committee on Urban Housing commissioned
TEMPo, General Electric's Center for Advanced Studies, to make an in-depth computerized
study of current and future housing needs. The Committee reported the results of the
TMo study:
The nonwhite family must pay an economic penalty because of racial discrim-
ination. 'Nonwhites,' Tnm'o concluded after amassing data on national housing
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little or no equity, instead of employing mortgage loans." The level of
black demand for housing, unsatisfied because the white supply was
forbidden, supported these practices.
Inasmuch as this pattern occurs over and over with respect to goods
and services and jobs, the segregated Chicago housing market may be
cost patterns, 'must earn approximately one-third more annual income than whites,
irrespective of household size, to assure [themselves of] standard housing.'
A DECENT HOME at 42.
Two surveys prepared by the Chicago Commission on Human Relations cover aspect5
of the Chicago dual housing market in depth: Selling and Buying Real Estate In a
Racially Changing Neighborhood (1962), which gives the history of every parcel fi one
block of the ghetto, including several being sold on contract by defendant-sellers in tile
Contract Buyers League case; Mortgage Availability for Non-Whites in the Chicago Area
(1963).
There has also been judicial notice of the racially dual market. In Chicago Real Estate
Board v. City of Chicago, 36 ill. 2d 530, 536, 224 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1967), the Illinois
Supreme Court found:
With respect to the quality and cost of Negro housing in Chicago, according to the
1960 census returns, 82% of the housing occupied by white persons and 59% of the
housing occupied by NIgroes was classified as being in sound condition. [Yet] the
same median rental of $88 was shown for both white and colored persons.
Problems of ghetto conditions and race relations in Chicago have received judicial
notice as early as the decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258-61 (1962), and
more recently in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 910-915
(N.D. fI1. 1969).
11. A mortgage under Illinois law is an interest in land given as security, usually In
return for a loan of money. The party who gives the mortgage (the mortgagor) and receives
the loan usually retains legal title to the property "subject" to the mortgage. The lender(mortgagee) has a lien against the property which he may enforce by invoking Illinois
foreclosure and sale statutes, if the mortgagor defaults, ILL. REV, STAT. ch. 95, §§ 17.23, and
ch. 77, §§ 18-27 (1967). Within a reasonable time (in chancery's discretion) after default, the
mortgagor can tender the amount of the outstanding debt and keep his property-the
equitable right to redeem. Even after a judicial sale, the mortgagor has a "statutory
period of redemption" of 6 to 12 months, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77 § 18(e) (1967), during
which he can tender the amount bid at the sale and keep his home. If the property
goes to someone else, the mortgagor is entitled to the excess of the proceeds of the sale
over and above the amount satisfying his debt to the mortgagee.
The Illinois installment land sale contract is usually titled "articles of agreement for
warranty deed," "trustee's deed" or simply "contract for deed." In the event of the
buyer's default, the seller can foreclose the contract like a mortgage utilizing a common
law vendor's lien proceeding. Or the law permits a contract seller, if the buyer is ill
default for 30 days, to declare the contract forfeited, retain all payments as liquidated
damages, and demand immediate possession. The seller will inevitably prefer the latter
remedy because he can then use the statutory procedure of forcible entry and detainer
(eviction), which is swift and streamlined. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 §§ 1-22 (1967). Originally
designed for trespassers and tenants in default of their rent, the forcible statute was sub.
sequently extended to reach buyers whose contracts were forfeited. The installment land
contract has been frequently characterized by Illinois courts as an executory contract of sale,
with the subject of the bargain to be transferred only when all conditions have been
fulfilled. Functionally, however, the contract is a financing instrument with the seller as
financier, freed from conventional mortgage strictures such as the appraisal disclosures
and lending limitations commonly required of savings and loan associations,
In summary, while the mortgagor-buyer has slightly more hope with each payment of
retaining his home or recouping part of his investment should he default, the contract
buyer finds that his seller does not hesitate to proceed for repossession, that lie has little
time to reinstate himself, and that his down payment, monthly payments, and expendi.
tures for improvements will be irretrievably lost regardless of how much he has invested.
In 1961 the Illinois legislature gave contract buyers purchasing homes thereafter a
flexible statutory period of redemption of at least 60 days if the buyer had paid in more
than 25% of the purchase price. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 § 13 (1967).
520
The Contract Buyers League Case
used to represent the commercial predicament of the black man in Amer-
ica wherever racial barriers restrict his access to resources. Similarly, the
theories of discrimination applicable to the housing market in Chicago
carry broad implications for other situations where market discrimina-
tion acts to disadvantage blacks. There is an additional, pressing reason
for the courts to address themselves to this phenomenon: this litigation
is only one of several efforts initiated by the Contract Buyers League
organization during the last three years to improve the lot of the black
homebuyer.12 As such, the case challenges the effectiveness of the
judicial process itself as a way of rectifying racial injustice "within the
system."' 3
12. The Contract Buyers League was organized in February 1963 after extensive research
work begun during the summer of 1967 by Jesuit seminarians and college students. ThL e
young men moved into a West Side ghetto apartment and engaged in a "listening process"
by which they came to identify the installment home purchase contract as tie most op-
pressive problem felt by their black neighbors. In response they researched the titles.
prices, costs and appraised values of hundreds of ghetto properties. When the high
markups taken by the sellers were revealed to the buyers in community meetings, the
people formed the League for the purpose of renegotiating the prices and obtaining the
safety of mortgage financing. Their tactics have included publicity, verbal persuasion,
picketing, several payment strikes, and litigation. The most complete history of the early
period is contained in a publication by a Chicago group, The Gamalie Foundation.
Progress and Prospects (revised September 1970). An excerpt from this publication can be
found in G. LEYcoE, LAND FINANcE at 208-14 (1969). One of the first collee student re-
searchers has published a novel based on his experience. D. QuAMIEN, To W ALH TilE LIzE
(1970). Other accounts of the League's campaign include Boles, Blad, Homeowning. Tim
Nmv REuBuc 7 (December 13, 1969); Chicago's Quiet Slum Revolt, AMNiAu 350 (Oct. 25.
1969); Garino, Slum Clearance, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2, 1969 at 12, col. 4; and
Home Buyers Fight Contract Racket, The Washington Post, August 4, 1969 at 1, col. 5.8.
In the winter and early spring of 1970 the League's payment strike finally brought mass
evictions of its defaulting members, reported inter alia in Douglas, Curse of Contract
Buying, EBONY 43, (June, 1970); and Sheriff Woods Evicts Moss Family, The Black Pan-
ther, Feb. 28, 1970, at 10, col. 1-3. The most complete coverage is found in the Chicago
newspapers: Crowd Foils South Side Eviction, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. S0, 1970, at 3;
Crowd Thwarts Sheriff in a West Side Eviction, Chicago Sun-Times, March 24, 1970, at 5,
col. 1-3; Twelve More Evicted, Crowd Stones Police, Chicago Today, M Iarch 31, 1970, at 3,
col. 1-4; Stop Evictions!, Chicago Daily Defender, April 1, 1970, at 1, col. 1; Snowstorm
Delays Evictions of More CBL Families, Chicago Sun.Times, April 2, 1970. at 1, col. 1;
Daley Will Mediate CBL Dispute Tuesday, Chicago Sun-Times, April 7, 1970, at 5, enl. 1;
Agreement is Reached on Evictions, Chicago Tribune, April 9, 1970, at 1, col. 6; Sheriff
Evicts CBL Chief, Chicago Daily News, April 21, 1970, at 1, col 5-6; 8 South Side Families
Evicted; 24 Jailed in Rock-Throwing, Chicago Sun-Times, April 23, 1970, at 7, col. 1-3;
Lindstead, CBL Chief Evicted, But Confident, Chicago Daily News, April 25-26, 1970, at 1,
col 4.
While unable to stave off evictions, the League's attorneys did obtain some liberaliza-
tion of the state's forcible entry and detainer proceedings, under which the contract
buyers were evicted like tenants. Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 111. 2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833
(1970). At latest report, the League has accomplished the private renegotiation of 106
contracts saving a total of $1.5 million for the families involved. Its goal is thie renegotia-
tion or judicial reformation of the 3500 to 4000 contracts remaining in the two federal
lawsuits. Contract Buyers League, What's Happenin' at CBL (newsletter), January 1,
1971.
13. In a last ditch effort to stop the evictions in December, 1969 the League's attorneys
petitioned a three-judge federal court to find the Illinois eviction statute unconstitutional.
The League, however, wrote to the panel on its own behalf:
For some time, people have been telling black people that they should reck redress
for their grievances by going through the courts. Our experience over the last year is
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II. The Nature of Discriminatory Action
A. Traditional Definition
To commit an act of private "racial discrimination," as the term seems
to have been applied by courts and legislatures, one must treat blacks
worse 14 than whites because of their race. This basic model of discrim-
ination visualizes the offender dealing with both races and treating one
less favorably than the other. Whether the proof of discrimination con-
sists of comparing his treatment of blacks with the way he had actually
handled whites under similar circumstances or consists of evidence from
which it can be inferred that he would have treated the races differently,
this is the conceptual model.1, For our purposes, such behavior fits
within what may be called the "traditional definition of discriminatory
action."
The illegal conduct found in Jones v. Mayer is clearly within the
traditional definition. There a white developer refused to sell to a black,
when at the same time he was openly selling and seeking to sell similar
property at the same price to whites. In the Contract Buyers League
such that we are beginning to believe that it is impossible for black people to getjustice through the judicial system. For us, things get worse when we try to get
"justice" in the courts.
Those of use who are in the Contract Buyers League are now beginning to question
seriously whether the situation is so impossible that it is foolish for us to continue
with the lawsuits we initiated (Cases 69 C 15 and 69 C 115). We are seriously consider-
ing asking our lawyers to withdraw these lawsuits because the judicial system of this
country apparently is not equipped to provide justice for poor black people.
Contract Buyers League, Memo to the judges of the three-judge panel for Federal District
Court, Dec. 27, 1969.
The evictions that followed soon thereafter were the result of the so-called "second
holdout." The first payment strike, begun in December, 1968, was ended shortly after the
filing of the federal lawsuits in January 1969. Payment withholding was resumed in July
1969, largely because the League members felt that the judicial process was too time.
consuming and provided remedies to the contract purchaser which were grossly unequal
to those available to the contract seller. Progress and Prospects, supra note 12, at 21-10,
That was six months after the lawsuits had been filed. Now, nineteen months later, as the
League newsletter reports, "the twenty-one staff people who are working zealously to
complete the discovery work in preparation for trial are optimistic that the lawsuits will
be tried this year." What's Happenin' at CBL, supra note 12.
14. Most generally stated, racial discrimination is the treatment of one race differently
than another, encompassing both discrimination against and in favor of a particular
racial group. Since this case involves only injury to blacks by discrimination against them,
the issues of "reverse discrimination" and "benign quotas" need not be discussed.
15. The notion of differential treatment of two groups of people by the defendant
himself lies at the very essence of a traditional discrimination claim. This idea Is so basic
that courts have rarely bothered to give it special affirmation. One case where the Ninth
Circuit did so is Agnew v. City of Compton, 259 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1957):
The plain purpose [of Sections 1931 and 1982] is to provide for equality of rights as
between persons of different races. The complaint under review does not allege that
appellant was deprived of any right which, under similar circumstances, would have
been accorded a person of a different race. It follows that no cause of action Is stated
under these sections.
Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
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case, Judge Will decided that Section 1982 was "equally applicable" to
"the sale of used residential property to negroes at higher prices and on
more burdensome terms than similar property is sold to whites."1 To
fit this statement into the traditional formula comparing the defendant's
treatment of blacks with his actual or probable treatment of whites re-
quires an inference that defendants would have treated whites differ-
ently, since actual sales or attempts to sell to whites by defendants need
not be shown.17 But as will be demonstrated, such an inference is impos-
sible to make since a lower price in the white market shows only that
there is traditional discrimination in that market as a whole, not that
the individual seller in the black market so discriminates.
B. Is the Sellers' Conduct Within the Traditional Definition?
If a seller establishes at trial that he sold to blacks only, the Contract
Buyers League court indicates it would receive evidence of sales to
16. 800 F. Supp. at 215.
17. Id. at 216 (quoted below). The greatest difficulty in understanding Judge Wills
opinion in Contract Buyers League is an underlying uncertainty whher he is really
trying to fit the allegations into a traditional definition of discriminatory action or
whether his test of illegality is an entirely new and different one. He may be saying that
the defendants discriminated if they charged blacks higher prices than whites are charged
for comparable housing in the general market, regardless of whether the defendants
would themselves have charged or did charge whites the same prices as blacks. In other
words, prices in comparable areas are relevant to the defendants' conduct not for eviden-
tiary value in showing what they would have charged whites, but as an "objective"
standard of liability imposing upon sellers an obligation to treat blacks the same my
others treat whites, rather than the way sellers themselves would have treated whites.
This uncertainty is most noticeable in the following passage:
Defendants also suggest that his case mannot involve "actual" discrimination, but
only "hypothetical" discrimination. Their notion is that because the complaint does
not state that defendants ever made sales of similar property to whites as they sold
to plaintiffs, the possibility of discrimination somehow disappears.
We first point out what should be obvious-that allegations are not "hypotheticals."The claim that defendants sold to negroes at a higher price than similar property
would be sold to whites will be subject to proof on trial. Second, and most important,
defendants' position elaborated is that if property is sold to a nero above what can
be demonstrated to be the usual market price, there can be no discrimination unless
the same seller actually sells to whites at a lower price. It should be dear that in law
this result would be obnoxious. In logic, it is ridiculous. It would mean that the 1866
Civil Rights Act, which was created to be an instrument for the abolition of dis-
crimination, allows an injustice so long as it is visited exclusively on negroes.
Id. At first glance, Judge Will appears to be saying that comparable sales have more
evidentiary value than mere hypotheticals. On closer inspection, serious questions arise:
In the second paragraph, where he alludes to the price at which "similar property would
be sold to whites," is he referring to prices defendant-sellers would have charged whites
for similar property or to prices white market sellers would have charged? Is it relevant
if the defendants would have asked whites to pay just as much as their black buyers, as
long as the "usual" market price is lower?
This Note later acknowledges that a new standard of "strict" liability like the one
Judge Will may be using might be supported by a textual anal)sis of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and a contextual analysis of the present-day phenomenon of mdal inequality,
note 156 infra. But such a development cannot rest upon the traditional conception of
discrimination basic to past cases, even Jones v. Mayer, because the fact situations pre-
sented there consistently conformed to the traditional definition of discriminatory action.
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whites, by other realtors, of comparable property in order to establish
what the "white price" for each home he sold would have been. Can this
evidence prove discriminatory action without disturbing its received
definition? The definition remains intact, we are led to believe, since
comparable sales would be looked to as an accurate prediction of how
much a defendant-seller would have charged a white buyer. Even assum-
ing that finding such data were empirically possible, 8 it is concep-
tually erroneous to look at the price differential between the black and
white sides of the market and call it discrimination by the ghetto seller.
Let us suppose that sales of comparable property could be found in
the white market at large.' 9 The comparison would then be made be-
tween two quite dissimilar things: the black market, with its sharp
demand and short supply, and the white market with its relatively lesser
demand and absolutely greater supply. Simple economics would dictate
a price differential between the black ghetto and the white market at
large. Assume that a ghetto realtor does no more than put up houses
for auction in black or changing neighborhoods. The bids he receives
from blacks, who have nowhere else to go, are higher than those
received by other sellers auctioning comparable property in a white
area only to whites.20 This is not, however, discriminatory action as it
has been traditionally defined.
If the ghetto realtor just accepts the highest bids as offered he has done
18. This is an assumption of heroic proportions. Arriving at a rcalistie "white price"
for a particular seller, buyer, and parcel of property demands controlling all variables so
that the effect of the buyer's race alone can be tested. To determine what comparable
property is, the court would have to look not only at the age, construction, and size of the
housing, but also its state of repair and the density, socio-economic status, and the quality
of the surrounding neighborhood. A similar white buyer must have the same credit bak-
ground, amount of cash available for down payment, access to mortage loans, occupational
status, education and family situation. And, to make a really accurate prediction of how a
certain defendant-seller would respond to a white buyer, the seller compared would have
to be a realtor with the same type of business organization, capital structure, access to
mortgage money, volume of sales, diversity of investments, costs of overhead, and internal
inefficiencies. Quite possibly there may be no combination of property, buyers and sellers
in the white market able to fit these criteria. Ironically, if such comparable property
were found, that would be inconsistent with the Contract Buyers League plaintiffs' own
charge that they are confined to the worst housing in Chicago. Contract Buyers League
complaint, count I, allegation no. 9(g), at 9.
19. What if the only nonblack sales fitting this description are found in ghettos In-
habited by poor Appalachian whites, Puerto Ricans, or Mexican-Americans? If the price
of housing for them does not turn out to be less than for blacks, does that prove that
neither the sellers nor the market discriminated? One would think that sales in other
types of ghettos would be unacceptable for comparative purposes, on the theory that the
purpose of anti-discrimination law is to remove differences in housing costs between blacks
and those whites who are untouched by ethnic residential segregation or discrimination
of any kind.
20. The economic analysis used here to explain the difference between black and white
price levels can be stated rather simply. Assume that price (P) is directly proportional to
the number of buyers in the market (B) (a quantity interchangeable with the concept of
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nothing to cause the prices to be different from those in white areas.
As long as he has competitors in the black market, and absent a price.
fixing conspiracy, when a seller "charges what the market will bear"
he engages in auction-like activity in which it is presumed that the mar-
ket, not he, controls the price level. There is an abundant supply of
black buyers who will outbid whites for property in ghettos and chang-
ing neighborhoods. No white sales2' will occur unless that supply is
exhausted, because no rational businessman will sell for less as long
as there are customers willing to pay the going rate.
So, if the use of comparable sales to predict what a Contract Buyers
"demand') and inversely proportional to the supply of homes available to them (S):
B
PCL-S
Further assume that there are two separate radal markets for housing, each with its own
group of buyers (Bb and B,,) and supply stock (Sb and S.). We have ample statistical
evidence that black market prices (Pb) are higher than white market prices (P.), so that
Pb >P,. It follows from this (assuming that P bears a constant relation to B1S) that:
Bb B,,
If preferences for housing are the same for Bb and B. and the homes contained in Sb
and S, are of interchangeable value, the inequality results from the pre-ence of a greater
number of black buyers per available home in the black market than there arc white
buyers per available home in the white market. It is believed that the most important
factor causing this inequality are the actions of those who created and now sustain te
dual market by establishing a larger white (S.) than black supply (St) per bu)er and by
preventing homes from moving from the white supply to the black supply. In other words,
those who control access to the larger white supply by virtue of their positions in the
selling and financing fields are able to keep out blacks and restrict them to the smaller
existing black supply.
Other factors may influence the disparity by increasing the number of black buyers (Bt)
per available home over time: a higher black than white birth rate, immigration to dty
areas from the South, and a tendency by buyers frustrated by lack of access to the white
supply to remain in the pool of potential buyers for a longer time. It must alo be
remembered that there is a force countervailing the protection imposed by most of the
white selling and lending community on the white supply-blockbusting by the "maver-
icks"-ghetto realtors like the Contract Buyers League defendants. It is important to keep
this model in mind, because the statement that blacks are in an inferior market position
is true only if there is a net restriction on black supply compared with white supply,. Tius,
if blockbusting completely counteracts the effect of white market restriction, there is no
net disparity in quantity of supply, but only on locational selection. See G. BDExm" supra
note 10, at 59-61.
21. The problem of sales to whites in changing neighborhoods has received consider-
able attention in discussions of the "tipping point" of a changing neighborhood. Morton
Grodzins, credited with originating the term, defines it as "the proportion of nonwhites
[which] exceeds the limits of the neighborhood's tolerance for interradal living." M.
GRODZiNS, TnE MErROPoLrrA AREA AS A RACIAL PROBLE.N 6 (1958). The sophisticated view
of this concept holds that most neighborhoods begin to tip not when whites "flee" but
when whites will no longer move into the area. The whites probably react both to race
and price: After the "tipping point" large price concessions would have to be made to
whites to induce them to buy; at some point whites would not move in even if the
housing were "free" as in the case of public housing. This can be seen as a price phe-
nomenon-whites cease moving in because the price level maintained by black demand is
too high. See testimony of Saul Alinsky, REPORT OF THE U.S. CO?,tt'N o.N C'iL RiGirs
443-46 (1959); R. H-Ipm,, supra note 10 at 296-300.
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League seller's "white price" would have been is based on the assump-
tion that the seller would have dealt more favorably with whites, that
assumption is invalid. Likewise, if ghetto prices exceed comparable
white sales, the conclusion that the sellers must have taken action to
cause the difference is invalid, since even if the seller is as passive as an
auctioneer the laws of supply and demand will inevitably dictate a dis-
parity. Thus, the mere disparity between prices in the white and black
markets cannot support an inference of discrimination. Despite Judge
Will's attempt to make the Contract Buyers League facts look as much
like Jones v. Mayer as possible, the complaint does not state a cause of
action which comports with the traditional definition of discriminatory
action.
C. The White Market Restrictors
A realtor who sold to the black side of the market did not engage in
the activity which really affected prices-that activity being the artificial
restriction of black entry into the white side of the market.2 2 Racial bar-
riers, by keeping blacks out of white residential areas where they could
afford to live, decreased the supply of housing available to them with
the necessary result of increasing the price within the restricted mar-
ket.23
Who, then, erected and maintained these barriers? They include those
who refused to provide housing to blacks on account of their race
(landlords, real estate agents, developers and private homeowners);
courts which gave effect to restrictive covenants; those who refused to
provide financing or imposed stricter requirements for blacks to obtain
it (savings and loan associations, banks, mortgage brokers); those who
declined to take black people's mortgage paper (insurance companies
and other investors, perhaps including the Federal National Mortgage
Association [FNMA]); governmental agencies which followed practices
of not insuring black mortgage loans (the FHA and the Veteran's Ad.
ministration) and those which acquiesced in the discrimination of the
22. Ironically, the blockbusting done by realtors in changing neighborhoods opposal
this restriction. See note 20 supra. The impact of this irony on sellers' possible liability
is considered in note 34 infra.
23. The price level for a completely open, unitary market would be somewhere In
between the present black and white price levels, since removal of discrimination against
blacks would open up the supply so that black prices would decrease and white prices
increase, eventually reaching at least a temporary equilibrium. The injury to blacks done
by white market restriction, then, could be seen as the difference between the black
price and the equilibrium price of a totally unrestricted market. But the gap between
actual white and black prices, larger than that amount, effectively measures discrimination
if we view it as the difference between the rights that blacks enjoy and the rights that
whites enjoy. See pp. 559-60 infra on discriminatory effects.
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financial institutions they supervised (the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board).2 4
In the Contract Buyers League trial, if comparable property is found
in white areas of Chicago at lower prices the question that should be
asked in seeking the responsible party is not "why didn't the defendant-
sellers charge these prices," but, to go to the source of the problem, "why
couldn't blacks buy in this market'? Ghetto realtors certainly would
have lowered their prices if they had had to compete with the white
market, with its relatively cheaper prices and easier financing. The white
market realtor or lender, whenever he refused to deal with a black on
account of his race, forced the black purchaser to "cover" by paying a
steeper price to a ghetto realtor for similar (or, more likely, worse)
property. The white market restrictor was the discriminator in tradi-
tional terms, and he caused the black buyer injury to the extent that
the cover purchase involved an increase in price, a decrease in quality,
or both.
The kind of activities allegedly carried on by those who restricted
black entry into the white market are dearly within the traditional
definition of discriminatory action. After Jones v. Mayer, many of these
activities are arguably violations of both Section 1982 and the 1968 Fair
Housing Act.25 Under the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Little
24. Many of these were contained as allegations in the original Contract Buyers League
complaint at 8-10. But the only ones who could be labeled white market restrictors actually
named as defendants were a few changing-neighborhood savings and loan assocations-and
they were sued mainly for lending to defendant-sellers. Contract Buyers League complaint
at 7-9. It was not until 19 months later thatplaintiffs joined as defendants George Romney
as Secretary of HUD, the FHA, the VA, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC), and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (HLBB). Count VII,
filed on August 11, 1970, amended the complaint to charge them with acts sounding in
white market restriction by traditional discriminatory action. (The FSLIC was named
primarily in its role of successor-in-interest to defendant-lenders as mortgagees under
mortgages made to defendant-sellers. See Thomas Todd, supra note 10, at 25.) Assertions
implicating them in the original complaint were re-alleged. In addition, the FHA was
charged with discrimination beginning as early as 1988 with "homogeneous neighborhood"
standards in its Undenvriting Manual and continuing through "economic soundness" re-
quirements and "red-lining" as late as July 1967. The VA was charged with engaging in
similar policies and practices. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was allegedly negli-
gent in its duty to supervise and regulate defendant-lenders so as to aid and abet racial
discrimination. A complete, rather devastating indictment of federal home financng pro-
grams is laid out in REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGrS: HOUSLMc 16-80 (1961).
See C. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NmGshBOns 229-S0 (1955). Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh. chaian
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, has recently charged the HLBB, FRA, and other
government agencies with continuing to support housing discrimination, according to a
New York Times editorial. White Magic, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1970, at 92, col. I.
25. The Fair Housing Title (Tritle VIII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 appears at 42
U.S.C. §§ 8601-31 (Supp. V, 1969). Justice Stemart in Jones v. Mayer said:
In noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 differs from the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in not
dealing explicitly and eyxhaustively with such matters (e.g., advertising, financing,
brokerage], we intimate no view upon the question wiether andllary tervices or
facilities of this sort might in some situations constitute 'property' as that term is now
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Hunting Park,20 discriminators are liable to victims in money damages
for injuries caused by their illegal conduct. Thus, if the black people
of the Contract Buyers League paid more for their housing than their
white counterparts, judicial relief theoretically could be full and com-
plete without abandoning existing civil rights definitions and without
subjecting those who are named as defendant-sellers to any liability at
all.
An analysis of discrimination by white market restrictors is, however,
insubstantial basis for leaving the contract buyers to their remedies
against these restrictors, unless the remedies in fact exist.
With respect to a case against the market restrictor, the causal link
between discriminator and victim is usually remote, with the discrimina.
tory practice operating more in the aggregate than in individual cases,
For instance, the FHA is charged not only with refusing individual
black applicants on racial grounds but also, as an effect of its general
discriminatory policy, with discouraging blacks from even applying and
influencing other discriminators to follow suit. Thus, the question is
raised whether the FHA is liable only to racially rejected applicants
or to the class of blacks who were eligible for FHA mortgage insurance
or to all black homebuyers or, even, to the whole class of black
Americans. A corollary question also arises: what proportion of the
inequality in housing prices suffered by the appropriate class of blacks
is attributable to one particular discriminator like the FHA? Yet the
FHA is really the easiest example because it is practically the sole sup-
plier of mortgage insurance to low-income people. In comparison,
assessing the contribution to price inequality resulting from the dis-
crimination practiced by a multitude of savings banks, 27 suburban
employed in § 1982. Nor do we intimate any view upon the extent to which dis.
crimination in the provision of such services might be barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ...
392 U.S. at 413-14, n. 10.
For comparisons of the coverage of the old and new Civil Rights Acts, see Smedly, A
Comparative Analysis of Title VII and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REv. 459 (1969): antd
Note, Jones v. Mayer-The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrilmlination
Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1019, 1027-49 (1969).
26. 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969). See p. 536 infra.
27. The loan requirements imposed by banks and savings and loan associations are an
example of how identifying a discriminatory act may be extremely difficult. For instance,
a policy of refusing to lend to double-income (husband and wife working) families or
recognizing only a fraction of the second income in determining cligibility may be de.-
fended as rational on the basis that such families pose a greater risk ot default. Neverthe.
less, this policy comes down much harder on blacks than whites because black families
have to earn more to pay the "economic penalty" of their race. This demonstrates the
theory of "circular and cumulative causation," developed by Gunnar Myrdal, which ex.
plains how the economic distinctions made in our society operate upon racist tendencies, and
vice versa, to further widen the gap between the races. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMIA
75-78, 1065-70 (20th anniv. ed. 1962); see also Note, Consumers and Antitrust Treble
Damages: Credit-Furniture Tie-ins in the Law Income Market, 79 YALE L.J. 254, 260.61
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developers and others, let alone private homeowners, is even more
difficult.
A question of timing also arises. The statute of limitations may bar
actions against those who have discontinued their discriminatory prac-
tices, though the effects of their discrimination are still felt through
oppressive long-term installment contracts and through the general
inertia of segregated housing patterns.28
Even assuming that an assortment of white market restrictors were
found guilty of discriminatory action resulting in increased ghetto
prices, it is unlikely that a remedy against them could achieve real
equality in property rights between the races. If discriminatory behavior
were stopped today, thousands of black buyers would still be locked
into many years of high payments under existing contracts; land sales
at high prices in black areas would continue until patterns of segrega-
tion finally dissipated. -2 9 In order to achieve some kind of economic
equality through compensatory money damages, black homeowners
would have to go to court "after the fact" of their purchase and pursue
a long, expensive lawsuit against a host of powerful business institu-
tions.
While the complications of proof and relief in litigation against white
(1969). Such requirements, though not directly keyed to race, can be attacked as traditional
discriminatory action if they are found to parallel racial lines or if historically their incep-
tion can be linked to avoidance of the "threat" of having to deal with blacks.
28. The benefit of a long period before limitations lapse can be of overwhelming im-
portance to a plaintiff in a case like Contract Buyers League. Actions under the 1955 Fair
Housing Act are governed by a 180-day statute, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (Supp. V 1969). The
court in Contract Buyers League, faced with a claim under § 1982 for which federal law
provided no statute of limitations, used the most nearly analogous state law, an Illinois
5-year "catch-all" statute. If the statute had begun to run when plaintiffs executed their
contracts, approximately 80% of the buyers, having signed prior to January 1964, would
have been eliminated from the litigation. Brief for Appellees at 9. Baker v. F & F In-
vestment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970). Instead, Judge Will decided that the statute ran
not from the contracts' execution dates, but from the termination dates, saying that as
long as the sellers "reaped" monthly payments "through continuing enforcement of their
unlawful scheme," limitations did not begin to run. 300 F. Supp. at 218.23. On inter-
locutory appeal, tht Seventh Circuit upheld the district court on this hotly litigated issue.
Sub nom. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970). Two things would make it difficult for actions against
white market restrictors to overcome the obstacle of limitations. Such claims would
be better brought under § 1982, rather than under the 1968 Act with its short
statute, even though the recent act may apply more specifically to the allegations. Yet the
coverage of § 1982 is in doubt. See note 30 infra. Secondly, in Contract Buyers League the
statute was kept from running largely because plaintiff and defendant were in a con-
tractual relationship. The courts apparently are unwilling to toll the statute of limita-
tions where the injurious impact of a defendant's action, though continuing, is not di-
rectly inflicted by the defendant himself. 300 F. Supp. at 220, especially n.7; Baker v.
F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191, 1200, cert. denied, 400 US. 821 (1970).
29. A recent study has computed indexes of residential segregation ('the percentage of
non-whites that would have to shift from one block to another to effect an even, unsegre-
gated distribution') for 207 American cities and found the average to be 86.2%. Chicago
had an index of 92.6% TAEUBER : ThAtrau, NEGors xN CITIEs 31-37 (1965).
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market restrictors may not be insurmountable, by contrast the black
buyer versus ghetto seller suit is much more straightforward. Uncertain-
ties plague the extension of Section 1982 to financing and mortgage in-
surance; but a sale if it contains any discrimination is explicitly covered
by the statute s8 The Federal Tort Claims Act may prevent damage
suits against government institutions like the FHA, while private
parties are not so sheltered.3 1 There is no "privity" problem: each buyer
sues his seller, much evidence of "wrongdoing" may be shown by the
plaintiff's own testimony from first-hand experience; the remedy is
reformation of the contract. Since the defendant continues to injure the
buyer by collecting excessive monthly payments from him, the statute
of limitations is kept from running.32 Obviously this felt injustice has
provided the whole energy and orientation (and much of the grief) for
the Contract Buyers League organization and its lawsuit.3 3 Relative
simplicity of litigation and buyers' subjective impressions are not in
themselves reasons for charging sellers with liability, but they should
prompt us to conduct an exhaustive inquiry before concluding that
there is no legal theory under which sellers could be liable.34
30. Judge Will in Contract Buyers League took a rather restricted view of the kinds of
policies, practices and transactions covered by § 1982, quoting Justice Stewart's cotnparlson
of the 1866 and the 1968 Civil Rights Acts:
The Court did point out that § 1982 was limited to activity directly covered by the
express terms of the Section. The Court thus stated, 'at the outset, it is important to
make dear precisely what this case does not involve,' and went on to say that § 1982
'does not deal specifically with discrimination in the provision of services or facilities
in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. e.. It does not refer explicitly to
discrimination in financing arrangements or in the provision of brokerage services.' ...
Of course, the alleged blockbusting and discriminatory lending in the Instant case do
not fall within the express terms of § 1982. However, the basic ciaim In this lawsuit
clearly does. The basic activity is the purchase of property.
300 F. Supp. at 215. But see note 25 supra.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80, especially §§ 2674 and 2680. Section 2680 lists as an exception
for which the federal government cannot be held liable-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion Involved be
abused.
This would seem effectively to prevent any damage claim against the federal government
where state action, either under any of the Civil Rights Acts or the Fourteenth Amend.
ment, is involved.
32. See note 28 supra.
33. Progress and Prospects, supra note 12, at 5-8, 14-15, 33-44.
34. There is a perennial cry of disapproval against this sort of liability: the risk of
legal action will drive sellers out of te market and leave the group we intended to
protect with less access to housing than before. The rejoinder is three-fold: (1) It may be
empirically false. Despite the disincentive of losing a particular business advantae by the
law's interdiction, there may be plenty of incentive left in the trade. Also, the improved
reputation of a business cleaned of its sharper practices and practitioners may attract
new entrants. (2) It exalts the value of status quo market activity over other values,
ignoring the possibility that it may be well worth the cost of a somewhat less active market
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Ill. An Expanded View of Discriminatory Action
A. The Broader Exploitation Claim--"Taking Advantage"
The primary violation of Section 1982 claimed in the Contract Buyers
League suit is not the seller's charging of prices higher than they would
have charged whites but the course of conduct which is described at the
outset of Judge Will's opinion:
[D]efendants exploited a system of de facto racial segregation that
existed in the City of Chicago [in] that by taking advantage of the
scarcity of housing for negroes in the City of Chicago [they] secured
unlawful advantage in the contracts executed by plaintiffs.3
In greater detail, the civil rights count of the complaint alleges that the
sellers, well aware of their customers' special vulnerability,"0 "exploited"
and "took advantage" of the inequality in bargaining position between
themselves and buyers. Most importantly, the resulting contracts were
oppressive-through them the sellers obtained compensation and pro-
tection grossly in excess of what was reasonable to yield a fair profit and
cover their expenses and risks. In particular, they charged prices far
exceeding the cost and fair value of the property, charged excessive and
usurious interest rates, and included many unlawful and unjust pro-
visions in the contract documents 7
As fully presented, the sellers' alleged course of conduct bears little
resemblance to action within the traditional definition of "discrimina-
tory" exemplified by Jones v. Mayer. Rather, the alleged conduct has
all the characteristics of behavior illegal under the commercial law
doctrine of unconscionability and the sellers' behavior thus includes
to eradicate a particular evil. In other words, the "favor" blockbusters confer upon blacks
by supplying them with housing loses its beneficence when the price amounts to an op-
pressive exaction. (3) Given these two reasons to continue to search for a %alid seles
liability theory, such a theory may be carefully constructed so as to achieve its objective
with a minimum of adverse market reaction, which is what this Note attempts to do.
See pp. 554-55 and note 156 infra.
35. 300 F. Supp. at 214.
36. The dual housing and financing markets deprived the black buyers of any mean-
ingful choice as to where they could buy and who they could buy or borrow from.
37. Some of the provisions found in most Contract Buyers League contracts include:
a restriction on the buyer's right to assign or sublet the propertB a prohibition on
mechanic's liens; a prohibition on improvements without the consent of the seller; a
prohibition of recordation of the contract; a confession of judgment clause; required
payments for insurance, with claim settlements to go to the seller rather than for repairs
to the building; a clause making the buyer liable for all attorney's fees incurred by the
seller in any matter arising out of the contract; no delivery of deed to the buyer until
principal amount owed is reduced by at least one-half; a provision that no title, legal or
equitable, shall vest in the buyer until deed is delivered; clauses calling for forfeiture,
liquidated damages, and eviction upon default of one payment; prepayment of property
taxes and insurance premiums; and assignment of rents. Exhibits 2, 3, 4 attached to
Contract Buyers League complaint.
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elements which can only be evaluated with the aid of commercial law
standards. In developing a theory of action based in part on such un-
conscionability, it is necessary, first, to determine whether the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, of which Section 1982 is a part, was designed to reach a
commercial injury whose impact is only on blacks. This Note will
ultimately argue that Section 1982 sweepingly prohibits all effects of
the phenomenon of racial discrimination in property rights, including
the actions of all those who carry out the effects of the dual housing
market as well as the traditionally recognized discriminatory actions of
those who created the biased market. Thus, commercial law standards
will be sought not for the purpose of grafting appendages onto an
under-inclusive statute. Rather, Section 1982 is a statute of broad yet
undeveloped authority, and commercial law can play an extremely use-
ful role by defining the scope of liability under it, identifying civil
injuries and their sources.
B. Importation of State and Common Law Through Section 1988
By enacting Section 1982, Congress declared that all citizens shall
enjoy the same rights to property as whites. At first glance, no provision
appears to have been made for the enforcement of this declaration.
Section 2 of the 1866 Act contained a misdemeanor penalty for "color-
able" deprivations of "right[s] secured or protected by this act."38
Section 1,30 from which Sections 1981 and 1982 were extracted by the
38. Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or
protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of
such person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment
of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not cx-
ceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 242. For the
historical evolution of the statute see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1945):
United States v. Price, 583 U.S. 787, 804 (1966).
39. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding,
Id. Notice that the rights expressed here are made pursuant to a declaration of citizenship,
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codifiers, contained no criminal sanctions. The entire 1866 Act was
passed without any specific federal civil enforcement provision. Yet its
title was "An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their
Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication."40 The only
language in the Act which spoke of comprehensive enforcement was the
second sentence of Section 3, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1988:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the
district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for
the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced
in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws
are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitu-
tion and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not in-
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause, and if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
(Notice that the codifiers took the vindication language from the title
of the Act and inserted it in the middle of Section 1988.) Throughout
most of its hundred year history, Section 1988 has received even less
attention than Section 1982; the section has often evoked an air of
mystery and skepticism. 41
Thus, it has been argued, they are entitled to more respect than the ordinary legislative
enaction, since these rights arise out of the federal government's overriding interest in
protecting what it deems to be concomitants of the dtizen-state relationship. C. BLcn.
STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 51-61 (1969).
40. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added).
41. Justice Clifford, dissenting in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879), remarked of§ 1988 (then R-S. § 722):
Examined in the most favorable light, the provision is a mere jumble of Federal
law, common law, and State law, consisting of incongruous and irreconcilable
regulations, which in legal effect amounts to no more than a direction to a judge
sitting in such a criminal trial to conduct the same as well as he can, in view of the
three systems of criminal jurisprudence without any suggestion whatever as to what
he shall do in such an extraordinary emergency it he should meet a question not
regulated by any one of the three systems.
Id. at 299. He dissented from a decision, concerning § 1988 and similar enforcement
statutes, that held: "The circuit courts of the United States have all the appliances
which are needed for the trial of any criminal case. They adopt and apply the laws of
the State in civil cases, and there is no more difficulty in administering the State's
criminal law." Id. at 271.
A recent survey of judicial civil rights remedies could say of § 1988 only: "[A]nother
unexplained early Civil Rights Statute." Note, Jones v. May'er-The Thirteenth Amnd.
ment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, supra note 2, at 1037 n.121. In short,
despite its recent judicial rediscovery, pp. 535-46 infra, § 1988 has never received a com-
prehensive scholarly analysis.
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Up until the Jones v. Mayer decision, Section 1 of the 1866 Act was
thought to cover only state action. Accordingly, Section 2 (18 U.S.c.
§ 242), along with Section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983), which apply only to state action, were used as the enforcement
statutes for Sections 1981 and 1982. The presumed lack of an enforce-
ment provision may well account for the dormancy of Section 1982 in
the area of private civil rights deprivations. The majority in the Civil
Rights Cases42 used the presence of Section 2 in the 1866 Act to limit
the scope of Section 1 to state action, saying that a Section 1 cause of
action could be no wider than the accompanying enforcement clause.
In Jones v. Mayer, without mentioning the textual analysis of its pre.
decessor bench, the Court pointed to the existence of Section 2 to dem.
onstrate that just the opposite was true; Justice Stewart stated that the
words "under color of [state] law" would have been surplusage in Sec-
tion 2 if Section 1 had no broader application. 43 A full realization that
Section 3, now Section 1988, was available for use in the area beyond
state action might have altered the holding of the Civil Rights Cases
and would have smoothed the path for the new interpretation in Jones
v. Mayer. And, suprisingly enough, there is legislative history indicating
that Section 3 was intended to be applied to behavior outside the ambit
of state action. Senator Trumbull, author of the 1866 Act, stated during
the debates:
Then, sir, the only question is, will this bill be effective to
accomplish the object, for the first section will amount to nothing
more than the declaration in the Constitution itself unless we have
the machinery to carry it into effect. A law is good for nothing with-
out a penalty, without a sanction to it, and that is to be found in
the other sections [note the plural] of the bill.44
After commenting on the "scare" effect of Section 2 as an instrument
of criminal punishment, he went on:
The third section of the bill provides for giving to the courts of
the United States jurisdiction over all persons committing offenses
against the provisions of this act, and also over the cases of persons
who are discriminated against by State laws or customs. 45
Although Section 1988 has been ignored as a private enforcement
42. 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883).
43. 392 U.S. at 424-26 (1968).
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). Senator ErvIn quoted this passage,
including its plural reference, but missed its implication entirely. Ervin, Jones v. Alfred fl.
Mayer Co.: Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REv. 495-97 (1969).
45. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).
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tool, within the realm of action under color of state law the section has
been utilized frequently by lower federal courts to "import" or "incor-
porate" state law and common law into the Civil Rights Acts. In the
leading case of Brazier v. Cherry,40 the Fifth Circuit described the pro-
cess of importation as follows:
On our analysis federal law is not suitable, i.e., sufficient, since it
leaves a gap ... in a substantive policy.... Since the Federal statu-
tory framework is, in the words of [Section 1988], "deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish of-
fenses against" that law and policy, the state law is to be used to the
extent that it is currently available to overcome these deficiencies. 47
Brazier incorporated both the Georgia wrongful death and survival
statutes into Section 1983 to enable the widow of a black man beaten
by policemen to sue them for violating their federal civil rights 8 Two
months earlier, in Pritchard v. Smith,40 the Eighth Circuit had employed
an Arkansas survival statute to permit a Section 1983 suit against the
administrator of the offender's estate. In Hughes v. Smith 0 Section
1988 was used to bring in a state statute of limitations. Despite the pau-
city of legislative history, these courts were able to discern congressional
intent from the words of Section 1988 itself. The Fifth Circuit in
Brazier said:
Indeed, Section 1988 uses sweeping language. It reflects a
purpose on the part of Congress that the redress available will
effectuate the broad policies of the civil rights statutes.0 '
46. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 921 (1961). The importation
rule was earlier applied in criminal prosecutions. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 271
(1879) (quoted note 41 supra). Many similar usages are found in criminal cae collected in
the U.S.CA. annotation to § 1988, although the opinions themselves rarely refer directly
to the statute. These cases include: Howard v. United States, 75 F. 986, 991 (6th Cir.
1896); Melarango v. United States, 88 F.2d 264, 265 (3rd Cir. 1937); United States v.
Gonella, 103 F.2d 128 (3rd Cir. 1939); Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Super. 63, 24
A.2d 460 (1942) (§ 1988 was then identified as 28 US.C. § 729).
47. 293 F.2d at 408.
48. Id. at 402, 407 n.15.
49. 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961), 88 A.L.R.2d 1146. The first attempt to apply § 1988 to
this particular problem was made in Davis v. Johnson, 138 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. M11. 1955),
where the court discussed the statute in partial support of its conclusion that the § 1983
action survived. Id. at 574. By the time of the decision in Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp.
220 (D. Colo. 1966), § 1988 was automatically accepted as the device for incorporating
state survival statutes into federal civil rights law. Id. at 223-24.
50. 264 F. Supp. 767, 769 (D. N.J. 1967), aff'd 389 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1968). When the
defendants in Contract Buyers League appealed Judge Will's decision on the running of
limitations, see note 28 supra, plaintiffs cross-appealed, seeking to replace the state statute
with a federal doctrine of laches. Plaintiffs' argument, based in large part upon the
language of § 1988, did not succeed. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191, 1195.96
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
51. 293 F.2d at 409.
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And in Pritchard the Eighth Circuit stated:
It appears to us that Congress by the language [of] § 1988 intended
to enlarge the civil rights remedy by authorizing resort to state
law .... 52
With the advent of new Congressional enactments against private
racial discrimination during the last decade came the realization that
even modern, highly detailed civil rights legislation might need the
assistance of Section 1988. In 1965, a Mississippi federal district court
in Sherrod v. Pink Hat Cafe 53 used Section 1988 to give the black plain-
tiff a right to money damages against a restaurant owner for violating
the public accommodation title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, thereby
extending a provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act to the private realm
three years before Jones v. Mayer. Once Section 1982 broke the bounds
of state action the Court at last began to feel the need for authority to
enforce the older law against private infractions. In the Jones v. Mayer
opinion itself, the Court listed Section 1988 among possible sources of
equitable remedies and of an implied right to compensatory damages
for Section 1982 violations . 4 The next step was taken in Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park55 where the Court relied upon Section 1988 as
authority for an award of tort damages to a white suburban homeowner
who was ousted by his community recreation corporation for attempting
to assign the right to use the corporation's facilities to his black lessee.
In so holding the Court stated:
[A]s we read § 1988 .... both federal and state rules on damages
may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed
in the federal statutes. Cf. Brazier v. Cherry. The rule of damages,
whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule re-
sponsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired. 0
52. 289 F.2d at 15.
53. 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965). The Sherrod court found that rights and
remedies available through other state and federal laws were not precluded by the nctv
legislation:
Thus section 1988 is retained, in full effect, and the rights that it authorizes to be
drawn from state law to achieve the purposes of federal enactments designed to
protect civil rights, are fully available to a plaintiff who has been deprived of rights
conferred upon him by Title II of the 1964 Act. If Congress had intended to negate
this result, it would have said so. There is no repeal of section 1988 in the 1964 Act.
Id. at 520.
§ 1988 has always been seen as more than just a supplemental provision for the benefit
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. In practically all of the previous civil cases, § 1988 had
come to the aid of § 1983, which was derived from the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
54. 392 U.S. at 415 n.14.
55. 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969).
56. Id. at 240 (citation omitted). Justice Harlan, in dissenting from the position that
the federal remedy could be imposed in the state court where Sullivan was brought, never.
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What Sherrod signaled for the 1964 Act, Sullivan signals for the 1866
Act: when all the complexities of private action are opened up to
regulation by civil rights laws, an enforcement statute of Section 1988's
flexibility and comprehensiveness is needed.
To summarize, the federal courts have been forced by the exigencies
of coping with the recent emergence of private racial discrimination
law, almost unconsciously, to move toward the use of Section 1988
which Congress originally had in mind. Where private discrimination
is found to violate any civil rights act, it is clear after Sullivan that state
and common law can be imported through Section 1988 to provide what-
ever remedy is necessary to equalize the rights of nonwhites to those
enjoyed by whites and to compensate victims of discrimination. 7
The difficult question remaining regards what kind of law Section
1988 can import. Early pronouncements indicating that Section 1988
was merely procedural have now been rejected.58 Beyond forms of rem-
edy like statutes of limitations, wrongful death and survival statutes,
and money damage allowances, it is an open issue whether Section 1988
theless granted § 1988's usefulness in federal district courts: "§ 1988 . . . suggets that
in those cases where it is appropriate to cure remedial deficiencies of a federal cil rights
statute by implication, this is to be done by looking to state law to see what remedies,
consistent with federal policies, would be available there." Id. at 257.
57. The most recent statement by a member of the Court on the question of civil rights
law enforcement and § 1988 is found in Adickes v. Kress & Co., 598 U.S. 144 (1970), con-
cerning the ordering of a new trial in a § 1983 case. justice Brennan, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, expressed his views on the kinds of relief available to the plaintiff
upon remand, a subject not taken up by the majority:
Section 1983 in effect authorized the federal courts to protect rights "secured by the
Constitution and laws" by invoking any of the remedies known to the arsenal of the
law. Standards governing the granting of relief under § 1983 are to be developed by
the federal courts in accordance with the purposes of the statute and as a matter of
federal common law. See Tenney v. Brandhove; Monroe v. Pape; Pierson v. Ray;
Basista v. Weir: cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park; J. 1. Case Co. v. Borah. Of
course, where justice requires it, federal district courts are duty-bound to enrich the
jurisprudence of § 1983 by looking to the remedies provided by the States wherein
they sit. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. But resort to state law as such should be had only in caes
where for some reason federal remedial law is not and cannot be made adequate to
carry out the purposes of the statute.
Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
58. In re Stupp, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,563, at 296, 299, 12 Blatchf. 501, 504, 508-09(a.D.N.Y. 1875); Schatte v. International Alliance, 70 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (S.D. Calif. 1497),
aff'd per curiam, 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 812 (1948) (Section
1988 was then known as 28 U.S.C. § 729); Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 228.29(D. Hawaii 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 256 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958) all stated that § 1988
refers only to procedure and forms of process. For a similar state court reading, see
Hirych v. State, 376 Mich. 384, 985 n.1, 136 N.W.2d 910, 912 n.l (1965).
The court in Pritchard refused to follow the Dyer case, stating, "We cannot accept the
view that § 1988 is procedural only." 289 F.2d at 157. Brazier took the same position,
pointing out that "[if it were] a statute incorporating merely state procedural mechanisms or
devices § 1988 [would have been], at least for actions at law, superfluous as a duplication
upon the enactment of the Conformity Act ...28 US.C. § 724." 293 F.2d at 403 n.18.
But see Hopkins v. Wasson, 227 F. Supp. 278, 281 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), af.'d, 329 F.2d 67
(6th Cir 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 854 (1964). See also note 59 infra.
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can use state and common law even more "substantive"-rules which
define the unlawful behavior giving rise to a cause of action-to give
detailed content to the general federal framework of civil rights law.
This issue was addressed directly by the Brazier court:
In enacting this legislation by reference to incorporate that of the
several states currently in effect when and where a civil rights
case would arise, Congress was under no restraint in enacting pro-
cedural, i.e., remedial, rather than substantive legislation or vice
versa. Consequently, it does not really matter whether in the eyes
of the local law the local statute, rule or decision thus incorporated
by reference is in the category of substance, or procedure, or mixed.
Congress adopts the whole "common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes of the State" without regard to its
technical local characterization. From a federal standpoint the
only limitation upon the use of such adoptive state legislation,
rule or decision is that it is suitable to carry the law into effect be-
cause other available direct federal legislation is not adapted to
that object or is deficient in furnishing a fully effective redress.
Thus § 1988 declares a simple, direct, abbreviated test: what is
needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make the civil
rights statutes fully effective? The answer to that inquiry is then
matched against (a) federal law and if it is found wanting the
court must look to (b) state law currently in effect. To whatever
extent (b) helps, it is automatically available, not because it is
procedure rather than substance, but because Congress says so.60
In addition, the court argued by analogy from other instances where
59. 293 F.9d at 409 (per John R. Brown, footnotes omitted). Technically, a wrongftl
death statute is regarded as creating a new cause of action.
This holding and statement contradicts other, mostly earlier, opinions holding that§ 1988 did not have reference to "rules of decision." In re Stupp, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13563,
at 296, 12 Blatchf. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1875); and Schatte v. International Alliance, 70 F. Supp.
1008, 1010 (S.D. Calif. 1947); or "cause of action," Hirych v. State, 376 Mich. 884, 885 n..,
136 N.W.2d 910, 912 n.1 (1965). See note 8 supra. However In re Stubp was a situation
in which § 1988, regardless of its characterization, was not needed at all:
The laws of the United States are fully suitable to carry into effect the jurisdiction
of this Court in this case, and they are adapted to the object of such jurisdiction,
and they are not deficient in any provision necessary to furnish suitable remedies
to exercise and enforce such jurisdiction.
23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,568 at 299, 12 Blatchf. at 509.
Two decisions since Pritchard and Brazier have established that § 1988 does not
operate to bring in state and common law where the action is grounded solely In sub.
stantive state law without the slightest claim of discrimination or deprivation of federal
civil rights. Hopkins v. Wasson, 227 F. Supp. 278, 281 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), af'Yd, 829 F.2d
67 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 854 (1964) (common-law slander only); Pierre v,
Jordan, 888 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 974 (1965) (purpose of lawsuit
was to put waterworks out of business, not to redress a constitutional deprivation). Here
it is argued that substantive state commercial law rules can be imported through § 1908
not as the sole basis for a cause of action, but as one component of a hybrid which Is
principally a claim of discriminatory action. See p. 541 infra.
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Congress had adopted state law describing illegal conduct as federal
law,60 and advocated a broad interpretation of the term "remedy."01
It may be objected that survival and wrongful death statutes define
only who may sue whom, not illegal behavior, and that Brazier ought
to be limited to its holding. Such a limitation of scope might be sensible
where illegal acts were defined with sufficient specificity by the federal
statute, leaving forms of redress unmentioned. But in the context of
Section 1982, a broad declaration with no acts specified, the meaning of
enforcement must be strong enough for Section 1988 to take up all the
slack in Section 1982, and define causes of action as well as relief. Also,
it is dear from the language in Section 1988 specifically referring to
criminal law that Congress authorized resort to state and common law
definitions of illegal conduct:
[I]n all cases where [federal] laws are not adapted to the object,
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to... punish offenses
against law, the common law [and state constitution and statutes]
shall ... govern [federal] courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment
on the party found guilty. 2
This seems to imply that when crimes like murder and assault are com-
mitted federal courts may apply state and common criminal laws pro-
hibiting such acts, if committed in such a way as to deprive blacks of
equal rights guaranteed by the 1866 Act.
60. The court cited the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333-43 (1964);
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964); provisions for collection
of tax liens, 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1964); and special maritime and territorial jurisdiction over
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1961).
61. There is nothing in this comprehensive declaration of a purpose to make a
policy fully effective which would justify reading the single word "remedies" in a
literal sense. It is hardly consistent with the diverse convictions so deeply felt and
often spoken by ardent champions of the competing forces in the stormy struggle
culminating in the Civil Rights Acts, see Monroe v. Pape, to think that they ),were
consciously legislating in terms of the mechanisms or devices generally associated in
the lawyer's mind with procedure as such. The term "suitable remedies" had a deeper
meaning. Used as it was in parallel with the phrase "and punish offenses against
law," it comprehends those facilities available in local state law but unavailable in
federal legislation, which will permit the full effectual enforcement of the policy
sought to be achieved by the statutes.
293 F.2d at 408 (footnote omitted). But see Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191,
1196 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
In fact, it is not necessary to conceive of § 1988 as a provision which works only when
the federal remedy is deficient, because the parallel construction of § 198B a plies equally
to "cases where [the federal laws] are not adapted to the object" of tie C URights Acts.
A statute like § 1982, which is simply a declaration of rights without enumerating illegal
acts, is not adapted to its object and requires the aid of § 1988 to formulate a broad
federal common law of discriminatory action.
62. Emphasis added. The Brazier court saw the substantive parallel between imported
criminal and civil law. See note 61 supra.
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To this reading of Section 1988 it could also be objected that the
statute was intended to be limited to crimes actually defined in the
1866 Act, i.e., Section 2 (now Section 242), except for cases that came
to the federal court through removal from state courts. But with Jones
v. Mayer we are given an interpretation of the 1866 Act that allows
federal courts original jurisdiction of private civil infractions despite
the fact only criminal acts under color of state law are specifically re-
ferred to in the Act. Since Section 1982 is stated in a declaratory fash-
ion,63 the courts will have to develop a "federal common law," as they
already have done for Section 1988,64 describing exactly what private
civil (and perhaps criminal) acts will violate the statute. Section 1988
answers this need by directing them to draw upon injuries defined by
the existing state and common law.
C. Racial Unconscionability
Federal civil rights law has now progressed, as has the economic
predicament of black people in America, to the point where racial
unconscionability can and should be introduced as a vital legal prin-
ciple. The essence of this concept may be briefly stated: An unconscion-
able contract which is so only because the buyer is held in an inferior
market position as a member of one race is an inherently discrimina-
tory contract, regardless of whether the particular seller would have
tried to impose the same contract on a member of another race. Thus,
racial unconscionability represents a type of discriminatory action that
goes beyond the traditional definition. But federal courts need no longer
feel, as they have in the past, so restricted to the literal implications of
federal statutes as the sole source of substantive civil rights law, that they
63. See pp. 559-60 infra.
64. See Justice Brennan's statement supporting this application of § 1988 in Adickes
v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231 (1970), quoted at note 57 supra. He then continued:
In some types of cases where the wrong under § 1983 is closely analogous to a wrong
recognized in the law of torts, it is appropriate for the federal court to apply the
relevant tort doctrines as to the bearing of particular mental elements on the
existence and amount of liability.
Id at 231-32. This Note simply urges the application of a relevant contract doctrine to a
wrong under § 1982. The common-law development of § 1983 dates back primarily to justice
Douglas's opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 187 (1961). The Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969),
holding a jailer liable under § 1983 for unlawful detention despite lack of malice, im.
proper motive or negligence seems to be the latest water-mark of the statute's common-law
expansion, which is carefully traced in a comment on Whirl at 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1154
(1969).
Observers are beginning to put two and two together with respect to § 1988 and the
common law. The Whirl comment, after approving of the Fifth Circuit's use of common
law principles, said in a footnote: "The court was, in a sense, compelled to such a result
[by] 42 U.S.C. § 1988 .... " Id. at 1162 n.35.
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cannot see discrimination except when it is presented in the obvious
form of one individual treating the races differently. The development
of new rules of liability is feasible now that the full potential of Section
1988 is being rediscovered. Employing Section 1988, federal courts may
create specific definitions of illegal conduct and begin to flesh out the
underdeveloped common law of Section 1982's broad declaration by
constructing hybrids65 of federal, state, and common law. The hybrid
suggested here, racial unconscionability, is composed of a racial com-
ponent derived from Section 1982 itself and a commercial component
drawn from state and common law.
As noted, the allegations of the Contract Buyers League complaint
set out an injury which can be best described using the commercial
term of unconscionability. Thus, the substantive content of the uncon-
scionability doctrine is chosen to provide the commercial component
of the hybrid. In the sub-sections following, the state of current uncon-
scionability law is compared with these allegations to determine wheth-
er, if a state court saw in an analogous commercial context the
diminished degree of meaningful choice and bargaining power imposed
on blacks by the dual housing market, it would grant reformation of a
burdensome contract.
The racial component of racial unconscionability comes from the
general declaration of Section 1982 that non-whites are to enjoy the
same right to buy property as whites do. It must follow that blacks
ought not to be subjected to any kind of specially oppressive contract
because of their position as victims of the dual housing market. In
order for such a hybrid rule of law to remain peculiarly racial, the
65. See generally Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HIv. L RU'.
289 (1969), which examines problems of federal review, jurisdiction, and preemption in the
development of hybrid law by state courts. Greene, introducing his topic, says:
[]n general federal law is a limited interstitial overlay upon the more complete system
of state law.
It would be impossible in such a context for either state or federal jurisprudence to
develop as a fully independent system. In fact, it is not at all unusual for any given
lawsuit to turn in part on legal doctrines derived from each of the two bodies of law.
The interrelation between the systems can take innumerable forms. State law claims can
be defeated by federal defenses; federal claims, by defenses derived from state law.
Various elements of a single right to recover may derive from each legal s)stem.
Because of this kind of constant interaction, it seems quite natural for our two
legal systems to borrow from one another, simply as a matter of convenience. Thus
federal law often adopts state standards, and, although much less frequently, the
states sometimes borrow federal standards, even in situations in which the supremacy
clause would not so require. For example, the state may make tortious what is
already forbidden by a federal regulatory statute, or private parties may attempt to
harmonize their state contractual obligations with their rights and obligations under
federal law. In each situation, the state has created a kind of "hybrid," a combina-
tion of state and federal law.
Id. at 290-91 (footnotes omitted).
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link between race and the commercial injury must be tight. Not every
unconscionable contract which a black person may enter into is racially
unconscionable-only those in which the relevant market accounting
for his lack of choice and bargaining power was clearly caused by racial
discrimination.
1. Sources of Unconscionability Doctrine
Judge Will found that the unconscionability claim in the Contract
Buyers League complaint did not state a cause of action under Illinois
law.616 This should not, however, foreclose consideration of whether a
claim for racial unconscionability is stated under an expanded under-
standing of Section 1982. As has been argued, Section 1988 dictates
quite different sources of law than were considered by Judge Will. First,
Judge Will's opinion on this point was based on facts alleged in Count
V, the section of the complaint where violations of the common law
and statutes of Illinois are charged. The court dealt with these claims
pursuant to its pendent jurisdiction, which allows it to determine, once
a federal claim has been stated, only whether a state court would find
infractions of its law arising out of the same circumstances.0 7 The
charge of racial unconscionability, on the other hand, is made under
the court's original Section 1982 jurisdiction so the court must look
primarily to federal law unless Congress directs it to look elsewhere,
Judge Will made it very clear that he decided the question of uncon.
scionability on purely commercial grounds, ignoring the racial com-
ponent of the course of conduct charged:
Finally, plaintiffs have also alleged that due to the shortage
of housing for negroes, plaintiffs were placed in a position of un-
equal bargaining power severe enough to render the contracts that
resulted from defendants' exploitation of this situation uncon-
scionable. But while the discriminatory exploitation of a system
of de facto segregation is unlawful under the Civil Rights Act, the
artificial shortage of housing for negroes does not constitute an
appropriate foundation for application of the principle of uncon-
scionability. As the principle is generally understood in the law of
the State of Illinois, it does not normally extend to situations
resulting from artificially contrived market conditions. By contrast,
the economic substance of the injustice described in this complaint
relates naturally to the concerns of the... Civil Rights Act. 8
66. 300 F. Supp. at 225-29.
67. 800 F. Supp. at 218; Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Sherrod v. Pink Hat
Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516, 518 (N.D. Miss. 1965); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 793 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 US. 901 (1969); and cases cited therein.
68. 800 F. Supp. at 227-28.
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"Discriminatory exploitation" cannot be ducked when racial uncon-
scionability is considered, because such a claim is brought under the
Civil Rights Act and because race is an integral and inseparable part
of the offense. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognized in
Sullivan that Section 1988 requires the use of those aspects of both
civil rights law and local law which will be most helpful to the party
seeking vindication of his civil rights.(" Even before Sullivan, the
Fifth Circuit in Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, Miss.y had said:
In civil rights cases . . . Congress has directed the federal
courts to use that combination of federal law, common law, and
state law as will be best "adapted to the object" of the civil rights
laws .... Therefore a federal court is required to use common law
powers to facilitate, and not to hinder "proceedings in vindication
of civil rights." 7' 1
Furthermore, Section 1988 authorizes application of state and common
law with the explicit proviso "so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States," and courts have relied
on such language to read out aspects of local law which would inhibit
effectuation of the purposes of civil rights law." This implies for
the Contract Buyers League case that if Illinois unconscionability law
refuses to recognize market conditions artificially contrived along racial
lines, that boundary should not prevent application of a law aimed at
alleviating racial inequities, for the federal interest is paramount over
conflicting state law.-
The search for the source of the commercial law component of racial
unconscionability is not an untroubled quest. One's reflex, conditioned
by Erie v. Tompkins,74 is to look to the decisional law of the forum state,
Illinois in the Contract Buyers League case. But a close scrutiny of
69. 396 U.S. at 240, quoted p. 536 supra.
70. 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
71. Id. at 284 (citing § 1988). Accord Brown v. City of Meridian, 356 F.2d 602. 605
(5th Cir. 1966).
72. For instance, Lefton waived a Mississippi statute which required removal petitions,
brought by SNCC demonstrator arrested for violation of local picketing laws, to be
pleaded individually rather than jointly. 333 F.2d at 284.
73. Again, Justice Brennan's discussion in Adickes, quoted notes 57, 64 supra, succinctly
states this federal policy interest:
The common law of torts may be divided on important questions of defenses and
relief, or it may be inadequate to carry out the purposes of the statute. Thus the
common law is not an infallible guide for the development of § 1983. In particular,
denial of equal protection on the basis of race was the central evil that § 1983 vas
designed to stamp out. Where that is the basis for recovery, relief should not depend
on the vagaries of the general common law but should be governed by uniform and
effective federal standards.
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 232 (1970).
74. ,04 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Section 1988 dictates a different approach: "[T]he common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held ... shall... govern ... ." Reference to "decisions by the highest
courts of the forum state" is conspicuous by its absence. It must be re-
membered that Section 1988 was enacted at a time when "common law"
meant the federal courts' interpretation of general law, that is, the whole
Anglo-American case law tradition. Swift v. Tyson75 in 1842 had inter-
preted the Rules of Decision Act70 to leave the federal courts free to
exercise their own notions of substantive common law in matters before
them, even in diversity cases. So Congress must have had this "federal
common law" in mind when it wrote Section 1988, intending to restrict
the federal courts' interpretation of common law only where state con-
stitutions or statutes specifically did so, irrespective of forum state
decisional law.77 This approach would certainly promote uniform
enforcement of federal civil rights. s In fact, the language of Section
1988 is more susceptible to this construction than the Rules of Decision
Act, for Section 1988 refers separately to common law and state statutes
75. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
76. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964) reads:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress othenvise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.
77. In Pritchard, the court used the followin& mode of analysis in applying § 1988:
First, it determined that no federal statute specifically dealt with the substantive issue
of survival. Then, the court concluded: "We find no well-established federal common law
on the survivorship issue. . . . Section 1988 indicates that in situations such as this,
resort should be had to state law to provide an appropriate remedy." Thus, the
Arkansas statute was adopted. 289 F.2d at 158. Justice Brennan subscribes to the same
process. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231 (1970), passage quoted at note 57 supra.
Several criminal cases in federal court have refused to apply particular state laws on
evidence, saying that their own interpretations of the common law governed In the
absence of federal statutes. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 415 (1920) (Penn.
sylvania common law on resubmission of matters to grand jury not applicable in federal
courts, which follows general common law); Hanley v. United States, 123 F. 849, 851 (2d
Cir. 1903); Bandy v. United States, 245 F. 98, 101 (8th Cir. 1917) (both involving rules on
corroboration of an accomplice's testimony); Young v. United States, 107 F.2d 490, 492 (6th
Cir. 1939) (admissibility of confessions).
78. See, e.g., Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1938); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943). justice
Jackson, concurring in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 US. 447, 471-72 (1942), spoke
of the relation between the federal common law and uniformity:
Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to match that of each
state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the accidents of service
of process and of the application of the venue statutes. It is found in the federal
Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal common law implements the federal
Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal
courts are free to apply the traditional common-law technique of decision and to
draw upon all the sources of the common law in cases such as the present.
See also Justice Brennan in Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 232 (1970), as quoted
in note 73 supra.
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while the Rules of Decision Act refers generally to "the laws of the
several states." 79 Thus, as to subjects not explicitly covered by state
constitution or statute, federal courts may use Section 1988 to rely upon
the entire body of commercial case law, within or outside of Illinois, to
define racial unconscionability.
There is a statute on uncoscionability in Illinois-Section 2-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code 8-but by its terms it applies only
to sales of goods. So we are remitted to the general common law', in this
case not by the Swift v. Tyson type of analysis but by the fact that
Illinois courts have said almost nothing about Section 2-302.8I Al-
though scholars may disagree on whether there existed a common law
of unconscionability before the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code,s a strong common-law extension of the principles of Section
2-302, now enacted in 49 states, beyond sales of goods has been develop-
ing. Many post-Code decisions in areas outside of personal property
sales, such as financing arrangements and real estate leases, have relied
on Section 2-302 and cases decided under it as precedent for finding an
unconscionable contract.Y Recent commentators believe, as Corbin
hoped, that Section 2-302 will not be confined to Artide 2 transactions.8
79. Act quoted at note 76 supra. Cf. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191, 1196
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 821 (1970).
80. Section 2-302 reads in pertinent part:(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.
IrY V Rv. STAT. cl. 26 § 2-802 (1967), enacted in 1961.
81. There have been only tvo reported decisions in Illinois even mentioning § 2-S02, let
alone expanding the statute beyond sales of goods. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First
Trust & Savings Bank, 103 m. App. 2d 190, 242 N.E.2d 911, 914 (1968); Dov, Coming
Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1969). If Illinois courts had
rejected expansion of § 2-802 to realty, then the Swift v. Tyson argument would apply.
82. A frequently heard statement is that § 2-802 is substantially a restatement of the
common law. Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code. 22
U. Msn L. R. v. 121, 128-26 (1967); WVilliams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 448-49 (D.C. Cr. 1965). Professor Leff strenuously disagrees. Left, Unconsdonability mid
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 528.29 (1967).
88. Financing arrangements: In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co.. 259 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa.
1966); In re Dorset Steel Equip. Co., 2 U.C.C. ER. Siw 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (consolidated
on appeal with Elkins-Deil); Whitestone Credit Corp. v. Barbory Realty Co., 5 U.C.C.
REP. Smv. 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); but see In re Advance Printing & Litho Co., 277
F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1967), ai'td 387 F.2d 952 (3rd Cir. 1967).
Real estate leases: Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 U.C.C.
REt'. SERv. 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
Chattel leases: Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Marsi Dress Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 363, 803 N.Y.S.2d
179 (1969).
Franchise agreements: Sinkoff v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.YS 0d 3M4
(1966).
Article 9 and negotiable instruments: Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101. 232 A .d 405 (1967).
84. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YA E LJ. 757, 808-12 (1969). Murray,
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Further, there are historical8 5 and policy80 reasons for applying uncon-
scionability to real property sales. In sum, one may dearly speak of
a common law of unconscionability applicable to non-sale-of-goods
situations, including real estate contracts, which can be imported
through Section 1988 to form the commercial law content of racial
unconscionability.
2. Content of the Unconscionability Component
In order to define sharply this commercial law component, we must
determine what elements comprise unconscionability according to the
case law of Section 2-302. One of the often repeated definitions is that
delivered by Judge J. Skelly Wright in Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co.:87
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to-
gether with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party.88
This definition includes both parts of the analytic breakdown, intro.
duced by Leff and accepted by subsequent commentators, into pro-
cedural elements (bargaining characteristics of contract formation) and
substantive elements (actual overreaching in the executed contract).8 0
Procedural. If we turn to the cases and commentaries, several bar-
gaining characteristics of contract formation appear relevant to racial
unconscionability. One of the most important ways of establishing lack
of meaningful choice has been a showing that the buyer occupies a
bargaining position inferior to the seller. 0 A few of the more frequently
Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 67 n.203 (1969). This devel-
opment was first predicted in Comment, Unconscionable Sales Contracts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, Section 2-302, 45 VA. L. REV. 583, 590 (1969).
"Wherever this section is made applicable to contracts for the sale of goods, no
court should fail to make it applicable to all other contracts; for the policy It adopts Is
applicable to all alike." 5A A. CORBIN, CoNaRAcrs § 1164, at 223 (1964).
85. Leff points out that the great bulk of so called pre-Code unconscionability cases
involved the practice of denying specific performance in equity to real properly trans.
actions, rather than sales of goods. Leff, supra note 82, at 533-34. See Spanogle, Analyzing
Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REy. 931, 937-38 (1969).
86. The doctrine of unconscionability is at least as appropriate to sales of real estate
as it is to sales of goods: Sales of land involve large commitments of resources--money and
time for payment-so that the possibilities for oppression are greater. Land sales are
usually "once-in-a-lifetime"; buyers become locked-in. Unlike buyers of consumable goods,
they cannot simply cease doing business with someone who deals unfairly with them. Leff
pursues these arguments at greater length. Leff, supra note 82, at 534-37.
87. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
88. Id. at 449.
89. Leff, supra note 82, at 487-88.
90. "In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross Inequality of
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heard phrases mentioned in connection with unequal bargaining posi-
tion are "necessity of life," "economic duress," and "specially vulner-
able class."
Food, clothing, shelter, and transportation are necessities of life;
courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that a person can choose to
do without them only at unthinkable cost to himself.01 It has been sug-
gested that as a rule contracts for necessities, like housing in Contract
Buyers League, ought to be more closely scrutinized for unconscion-
ability than luxury purchases. 92
Duress has long been a procedural element of unconscionability 3
As a doctrine standing on its own, it has traditionally required acts
or threats by the seller forcing the buyer to enter into the contract
before the contract will be rendered unenforceable." However, the
Restatement of Contracts in Section 496 does leave an opening; it pro-
vides for avoidance of a contract if duress by a third person (like white
market restrictors?) coerced its execution.98 A movement toward a
broader usage of the term was heralded by Dawson's famous article on
"economic duress" in which he stated:
The fact situations toward which duress doctrines are directed are,
overwhelmingly, situations in which an unequal exchange of values
has been coerced by taking advantage of a superior bargaining
position.98
The current reach of the concept of economic duress is demonstrated
by In re Elkins-Dell Mig. Co.,97 a bankruptcy proceeding in which cer-
tain security arrangements executed by a necessitous borrower for the
bargaining power." Williams v. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). This
statement was repeated in Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d
264, 267 (1969). The most thorough judicial treatment of inequalities in bargaining cu.
tion is given in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 889.91, 161 A.2d 69,
86-87 (1960). Much of the discussion on this topic has gone on under the heading of
"adhesion" contracts. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943); Leff, supra note 82, at 504-08. One com-
mentator has suggested that an unequal bargaining position is essential to every un-
conscionable contract. See note 137 infra. Ineuality of bargaining position can result
from particular contingencies as well as from disparity of status, according to EUinghaus,
supra note 84, at 767-68.
91. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386-87, 161 A.2d 69, 85-86 (1960).
92. Spanogle, supra note 85, at 955; Murray, supra note 84, at 29.
93. 1 A. CO RIN, CoNmAcrs § 128, at 551 (1964). See, e.g., Caviano v. Brill, 171 Misc.
298, 11 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1939).
94. RrATEMNT OF CoTcr s §§ 492-95 (1932). See Goebel v. Iinn, 47 Mich. 489, 11
N.W.284 (1882).
95. See also ~rASTTMdENT OF CONTRACTs § 477 (1932).
96. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Micit. L. Rzv. 253, 285
(1947).
97. 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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assignment of his accounts receivable were found unconscionable, the
court saying:
Another species [of unconscionable contract] concerns what is
basically economic duress. In the absence of a general mandate to
review the adequacy of consideration, there has sometimes been a
review of the economic positions of the parties and a finding that
the position of one was so vulnerable as to make him the victim
of a grossly unequal bargain.98
There has also been a movement toward consolidating much of the
procedural component of unconscionability law by creating specially
vulnerable classes of people whose contracts are to be more closely
examined for unfairness. Ancient classifications of "sheltered" people
include minors, sailors, expectant heirs, and, sometimes, farmers and
women. 99 There has been a similar trend toward making certain types
of personal disabilities hardened categories; the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code [UC3] in Section 6.111(3) (e) has gone so far as
to list some of them in proposed statutory text.10 The class most often
(and heatedly) discussed is the "under-privileged consumer."10' A series
of cases have acknowledged and turned on the special weaknesses of this
class: Williams v. Walker-Thomas involved sale of a stereo to a woman
on welfare with seven children. 0 2 As Leff points out, subsequent com-
98. Id. at 871. See Davenport, supra note 82, at 131-34.
99. 3 POMIEROY, EQurrY JuRisi-RuDENcE §§ 944-49, 952-53 (1941); Leff, supra note 82, at
531-33.
100. Section 6.111 [Injunctions Against Unconscionable Agreements and Fraudulent or
Unconscionable Conduct].
(3) In applying this section, consideration shall be given to cads of the following
factors, among others:
(a) belief by the creditor at the time consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or
consumer loans are made that there was no reasonable probability of payment In full
of the obligation by the debtor;
(b) in the case of consumer credit sales or consumer leases, knowledge by the
seller or lessor at the time of the sale or lease of the inability of buyer or lessee to
receive substantial benefits from the property or services sold or leased;
(c) in the case of consumer credit sales or consumer leases, gross disparity between
the prices of the property or services sold or leased and the value of the property or
services measured by the price at which similar property or services are readily ob.
tainable in credit transactions by like buyers or lessees;
(e) the fact that the respondent has knowingly taken advantage of the inability
of the debtor reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental In-
firmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agree-
ment, or similar factors.
101. This term comes from Ellinghaus, supra note 84, at 768-73. For other views, see
Leff, supra note 82, at 555-58; Spanogle, supra note 85, at 955; and Shanker & Abel, Con.
sumer Protection under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Oto ST. L. J. 689,
702-04 (1968).
102. 350 F.2d at 448. For a fuller presentation of the judical motivation behind
Williams, see Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1969, § 6
(Magazine).
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mentary seems to consider the salient fact of this case to be the sale of
an expensive item to such a person, the seller knowing she could not
afford it.103 State by Lejkowitz v. ITM, Inc.1°4 found unconscionability
in a referral plan whose "recruitments," as Ellinghaus (who believes
that the underprivileged consumer is a sui generis category) puts it,
.were apparently sought from low-income and low-literacy strata of
society."' 05 Finally in Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,100 the court explicitly
stated:
The very limited financial resources of the purchasers, known to
the sellers at the time of the sale, is entitled to weight in the bal-
ance. 07
And in UC3 Section 6.111(3) (a), the seller's belief that the buyer will
not be able to pay is seen as a factor of unconscionability103
Is the black homebuyer, disadvantaged by racial discrimination and
segregation, eligible as a specially vulnerable class for institutionaliza-
tionY09 in unconscionability law? There are several objections to such
a classification. First, Leff argues that supra-personal categories im-
mensely simplify decision and foster grave inaccuracies because inquiry
into the actual bargaining situation is foreclosed L10 In answer to that,
the Contract Buyers League case contemplates extensive proof of how
discrimination and segregation restrict the black buyer's housing choices.
The class will be identified not simply as members of the black race,
but by "very concrete and particular references to... vulnerability of
bargaining position," as Ellinghaus suggests in arguing for institu-
tionalization of the "class" factor." Secondly, it may be objected that
such a classification is racist and patronizing in that it makes black
people "presumptive sillies" like careless sailors, expectant heirs and
helpless women, unable to take care of themselves. This is not so, for
103. Leff, supra note 82, at 555, and articles cited therein.
104. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966). In Frostifresh Corp. v. Re-noso, 52
lMisc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd with respect to damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281
N.Y.S.2d 954 (1967), another case where a contract was declared unconscionable, "the
defendant husband told the salesman that he had but one week left on his job and he
could not afford to buy the appliance." Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
105. Ellinghaus, supra note 84, at 770.
106. 59 Misc.2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
107. Id. at 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
108. Note 100 supra.
109. Ellinghaus, supra note 84, at 771. Compare equal protection law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, where race is regarded as the prototype of suspect casifications,
requiring judicial review on the more rigorous compelling state interest standard. See
generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L, RE. 1065, 1124-27
(1969).
110. Leff, supra note 82, at 555-56.
111. Eflinghaus, supra note 84, at 772.
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the unequal bargaining position of the black buyer, as a black, does not
result from any want of mature, intelligent, informed deliberation, but
from the economic predicament which forces him to do business on the
ghetto realtor's terms or not at all.112
For these reasons black homebuyers, disadvantaged as they are by the
dual housing market, make a much more valid category of people need-
ing protection from commercial oppression than do those fitting the
classification of "improvident consumers." But there is an additional
reason why the procedural element of racial unconscionability should
be fulfilled by recognition of disadvantaged black homebuyers as a
specially vulnerable class. As victims of discrimination against their
race, they are singled out by Section 1982 for protection which will
guarantee them equality in property rights. This specific congres-
sional designation comports with Leff's admonition that "if one wants
to protect a class.., it is at least arguable that one should just up and
do so-but clearly."' 13
All of the procedural factors just presented 14 are external circum-
stances-circumstances inhibiting the buyer's meaningful choice of
112. In their "Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss," the Contract
Buyers League plaintiffs argued this very point:
The circumstances revealed by the complaint demonstrate that the Negro plaintiffs
had no meaningful choice. As a result of racial discrimination, the would-be Negro
buyer was automatically placed in an inferior bargaining position. He was a buyer
in a market which was made to order for unscrupulous sellers. If the Negro did not
accede to the terms dictated by the few sellers in the market, he could not buy a new
home.
Brief for Plaintiffs at 48, Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 800 F. Supp. 210
(N.D. IIl. 1969).
113. Leff, supra note 82, at 558.
114. Not listed are certain personal disabilities like ignorance, sickness, drunkennes,
and old age, which have also been important in stimulating the courts to find tin.
conscionability. See notes 99-100 supra. The only individual disabilities claimed by the
Contract Buyers League plaintiffs over and above their weak market position as subjects
of racial discrimination and segregation are lack of formal education and lack of sophlistica.
tion in real estate matters. While these may be indirectly caused by race in that blacks
generally receive inferior schooling, the concept of racial unconscionability demands that
we focus on contract abuses directly related to race and not consider individual differences
that may exist among blacks. Besides, if buyers had lawyers, as many of them did, the
effects of personal disabilities would be nullified. But see testimony of Ralph Nader
on the Contract Buyers League problem, Hearings on S. 2045, S. 3097, S. 3165, and S. 3240
Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization and Gov't Research of the Senate
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1970):
I would put the primary responsibility of that unconscionable contract on the legal
profession. I would recommend suspension or disbarment proceedings for any lawyer
who has anything to do with the creation and transfer of that kind of contract on
behalf of his client, and that is just where the responsibility from now on must be
placed.
When there is this type of vicious exploitation, as we know, some of these stories
are enough to make strong men weep as reported in the Chicago papers, the lawyer
must begin to stand on his own two feet and not justify everything he does on the
basis that he is just representing his client. He has got to become a primary human
being, not just a secondary human being, and there comes a point whereby the limits
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which the seller is awaren 5 but over which he has no control. While the
economic circumstances of the dual market fully satisfy the procedural
requirement in this case, the requirement has been met in other ways
too. The procedural element of unconscionability may also consist of
direct conduct by the seller which inhibits the buyer's choice or misleads
him. In the Contract Buyers League complaint, one can find allegations
that the transactions were to some degree tainted with undue influence,
fiduciary relationships, misrepresentation, concealment, fraud, deceit,
adhesion form contracts and refusals to negotiate."10 Nevertheless, ques-
tionable seller conduct ought not to be necessary to the concept of
racial unconscionability. Since the action is one brought by blacks as
a class, we want to avoid inquiring into the idiosyncracies of each trans-
action to determine whether the seller has insulated himself by refrain-
ing from such behavior. Even if some "bargaining naughtiness" were
present in every transaction, in order to be consistent with the auction
model of seller behavior"z7 we must focus on race alone as a bargaining
circumstance. Indeed, as will be seen," 8 evidence of improper seller
conduct is not necessary to a prima facie case of unconscionability.
Substantive. Courts are relying more and more heavily on the exe-
cuted contract itself as a determinant of unconscionability. At one time
when courts found grossly inadequate consideration or a misallocation
of legal rights and responsibilities, unjustified by economic necessities,
they seemed to look backward to the bargaining process and assume
something had gone wrong there. Now, regardless of actual or presumed
procedural abuses, a contract may be deemed unconscionable as a whole
because of "overall imbalance" or in part ("component unconscion-
ability")119 because certain terms, including price, may be unreasonably
favorable to one party and oppressively harsh on the other.-'= The
of advocacy are so exceeded and the domain of unconscionable vidous exploitation
is so deep and broad that the lawyer must either say I want out or be subjected to
disdplinary proceedings.
115. There are indications that seller knowledge of a buyer's disabilities or economic
circumstances is significant in unconscionability theory. In all the "impecunious consumer"
cases mentioned earlier, notes 102, 104, 106 supra, the buyer's impoverished condition was
communicated to the seller. Certainly where a personal trait of the buyer like financial
status is not readily apparent to the seller, actual knowledge would seem to be essential.
This is the thrust of UC3 § 6.111(3), which is replete with requirements for seller "belief"
and "knowledge," quoted at note 100 supra. In the Contract Buyers League case, the
sellers' awareness of racial discrimination in housing can in most instances be safely as-
sumed from his position as an experienced realtor.
116. Contract Buyers League complaint at 10, 11, 14, 15.
117. Pp. 524-26 supra.
118. P. 556 infra.
119. These two concepts are treated at length in Leff, supra note 82, at 509-16 and
Ellinghaus, supra note 84, at 775-87, and cases cited therein.
120. See the Williams definition of unconscionability, p. 546 supra.
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definition of oppression best fitting the Contract Buyers League facts
is that presented by one commentator:
An oppressive contract is one in which party A forces party B to
accept burdensome terms, not justified by commercial necessities,
as the cost of obtaining the contract's benefits. B accepts the oppres-
sive terms, although aware of the consequences, because his bargain-
ing power is such that he must do business on A's terms or not at
all.121
The most important contract component for the Contract Buyers
League buyers is the price term. The long-standing rule that "courts
will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration" has been deeply
eroded by recent unconscionability law, so that the New York Supreme
Court could say in Jones v. Star Credit:
Indeed, no other provision of an agreement more intimately
touches upon the question of unconscionability than does the term
regarding price.122
This decision is only the latest in a series of unconscionability cases
where contracts have been declared unenforceable on the basis of ex-
cessive price alone.123 Commentators are beginning to try to distill frot
these cases a definite ratio of actual price to fair price akin to the fixed
ratio figures of laesio enormis in civil law. 24 Without assigning it a
value, UC3 includes a provision for "gross price disparity" in proposed
statutory text.125
121. Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionabililty: A Suggested Approach to
UCC Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 998, 999 (1966) (emphasis added).
In discussing the statement in the Comment to § 2-302 that "the principle is one of the
prevention of oppression," Spanogle concludes:
There are at least two different connotations of the word 'oppression,' and the
definition of the word will vary according to which of them is emphasized. A court
may find that 'oppression' connotes only those harsh terms obtained through op-
pressive means, so that the definition of the term depends upon procedural abuses.
But a court may also interpret 'oppression' to mean terms, however obtained, that will
create oppressive effects, so that procedural abuses are irrelevant. Under this in-
terpretation, the real question is whether enforcement of the contract terms will rc-
suit in oppression, rather than whether those terms were caused by objectionable
procedures. Although either a result-oriented or a cause-oriented definition is arguably
correct, the case law supports at least a limited use of the former definition.
Spanogle, supra note 85, at 948. See also Leff, supra note 82, at 499-501.
122. 59 Misc. 2d at 191, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
123. American Home Improvement v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 439, 201 A.2d 886, 889,
14 A.L.R.3d 324 (1964); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 27-28, 274 N.Y..2t1
757, 759 (1966), rev'd with respect to damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9&4 (1967);
State by Lefkowitz v. ITM, 52 Misc. 2d 39, 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (1966); Toker v,
Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 502, 247 A.2d 701, 703 (1968).
124. French law uses a ratio of 2:1 and German law, 5:3. Shanker & Abel, supra note
101, at 706; Davenport, supra note 82, at 966-67. For criticism, but a generally favorable
response, see Leff, supra note 82, at 548-49; and Ellinghaus, supra note 84, at 790.
125. See note 100 supra (subsection [c]).
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The most difficult problem in applying a fixed rule regarding an
unconscionable price term is determining the base figure-the fair price.
Leff demonstrated how the Maclver decision fell into one pitfall; it
ignored the effect of the time-price differential, which may have
amounted to fair interest on a fair cash price.'20 The two standards that
appear most rational are the "reasonable return" test of Frostifresh
Corp. v. Reynoso 2 7 and the "comparable transaction" rule found in the
UC3. Based on a record containing a Section 2--02(2) hearing as to
"commercial setting, purpose and effect," the New York Appellate Term
in Frostifresh reversed a previous opinion on the issue of damages and
held that the seller was entitled to "net cost for the refrigerator-freezer,
plus a reasonable profit, in addition to trucking and service charges
necessarily incurred and reasonable finance charges."' -8 A different
standard for the base price is proposed by UC3 Section 6.111 (3)(e):
"Value" is to be measured by "the price at which similar property or
services are readily obtainable in credit transactions by like buyers or
lessees."1
29
The typical transaction presented in the exhibits to the Contract
Buyers League complaint involves the seller's purchase of a home from
the previous (usually white) oivner for $15,000, financed by a $14,000
mortgage loan from a savings and loan association, and a resale within
a few days or weeks to the black buyer at a contract price of $24,000,
with $1,000 down payment and the balance to be paid in monthly
installments at 7% interest. Even if the $9,000 difference between the
two "cash" prices were "pure profit" to the seller, the disparity falls
short of the 2:1 ratio of actual price to fair price seen by some observers
in prior cases. But the same reasons that suggest a liberal application
of unconscionability law to real property sales'30 also suggest that courts
should be able to find unconscionability in smaller proportional price
disparities than in sales of goods. Because of the sheer size, time commit-
ment and once-in-a-lifetime nature of a home purchase, the oppressive
impact of a 40% overcharge on a $17,000 house is greater than a 200%
overcharge on a $300 refrigerator.' 31
126. LefF, supra note 82, at 549-50.
127. 54 Misc. 2d 119, 120, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (1967), rev'g with respect to damages
52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
128. Id.
129. See note 1OO supra.
130. See note 86 supra.
131. In another piece of "extraneous correspondence," the Contract Buyers League told
Judge Will of their hardships in trying to meet the monthly home purchase installments:
Most of our families are working two and three jobs to meet these notes. In doing
this, they have to leave their children unsupervised and be embarrassed becaue they
do not have money to make repairs. We believe that is hardship. Moreover, since
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As for the determination of the base, an issue which affects both
liability and the measurement of damages, 132 the correct standard would
seem to be the reasonable return rule used in Frostifresh-reasonable
cost and expenses plus a reasonable profit. Inasmuch as expenses may
include the risks of "managing" (i.e., collecting on and foreclosing)
property in a ghetto neighborhood, it must be remembered that un-
conscionability is to be determined as of the time of the transaction,0 3
meaning that expenses attributable to seller practices aggravating the
risks of collection and foreclosure ought to be disallowed. 184 It might be
contended that the appropriate price in a case of racial unconscionability
is the UM3 "comparable transaction" price paid by similar white buyers
for similar property (a figure perhaps impossible to determine empiri-
cally for the housing market). While evidence of business practices in
other areas might help the court assess the reasonableness of a ghetto
seller's profits and the efficiency of his operation, if the white price is
still much below the price which would give a ghetto seller a reasonable
return it should be a red flag that the white area business may not be
truly similar. Instead, the focus should be on the ghetto realtor himself.
If the overcharge based on the "reasonable return" computation is more
than it would be based on the comparable white transaction price, it
might be argued that only the smaller overcharge results from the
operation of racial factors. But the theory is one of racial unconscion.
ability where racial factors are significant as the premises of unequal
bargaining power and lack of meaningful choice-the question whether
sellers took oppressive advantage of these factors is to be answered by
looking at whether the consideration, rights and responsibilities under
the contract are reasonably allocated between buyer and seller them-
selves. Lastly, the use of a standard geared to prices in another market
which the ghetto seller must follow at his peril would be a severe dis.
everyone of our families is paying between 35% and 45% of monthly income (we have
included rents received by owners of two-flat buildings as part of monthly income) as
contract payments, we believe that every case is a hardship case, especially since the
Federal Housing Act of 1968 provides that subsidies will be granted for anything over
25% if low income families are buying on mortgage.
Contract Buyers League, Memorandum to the Honorable Hubert L. Will, November 14,
1969 (emphasis in original). See also the chart in Progress and Prospects, supra note 12,
at 23-24.
Judicial attacks on smaller-than-2:1 overcharges are not unheard of, even in Illinois, In re
Chicago Reed & Furniture Co., 7 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1925), refused to enforce a contract
calling for a profit of 40%, finding it "so manifestly harsh and oppressive as to shock the
conscience." If it is thought that a judicial scrutiny of profits this closely will end real
estate "speculation" in ghetto homes, that is exactly what is suggested. See note 34 supra,
132. Pp. 557-58 infra.
133. Section 2-302[1]; Williams v. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
134. Some of these practices are described by Satter in the Chicago Bar Record, supra
note 10, at 263.
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incentive to anyone doing real estate business in a black area, while
the rule approved here strikes only at profits which are unreasonable
and unfair.i35
Finally, the term "base" is not to be confused with the principal
amount owed under the contract, to which interest is added. Where
both a sale and financing are concerned, base for unconscionability
purposes is composed of a fair cash price and a fair interest rate. If
a defendant-seller claims that his cash price is high because the usury
laws prevent him from covering what he considers his "financing risk"
with a higher rate of interest, the issue becomes whether the additional
interest amounts to an illegal overcharge. But then the seller is in even
deeper trouble, for the legality of the price will be tested by the un-
conscionability law and by the usury statutes, which are backed by
harsh penalities.
Also within the range of substantive unconscionability, other con-
tractual provisions can-just as have price terms-be declared illegal
or unenforceable or cause a court to refuse to enforce the entire con-
tract. A number of clauses recently found unconscionable under Section
2-302 or unenforceable under other statutes bear resemblance to pro-
visions commonly included in Contract Buyers League contracts. As
further evidence of substantive oppression, their presence strengthens
a claim of racial unconscionability4 3
Elements of a prima facie case. This brings us to the question whether
a prima facie case of racial unconscionability is made out by proving
(1) a racially discriminatory housing market, (2) making blacks as a class
specially vulnerable to commercial oppression, and (3) a sale of housing
135. See note 34 supra, note 156 infra.
136. A list of typical Contract Buyers League clauses is gven at note 37 supra.
Particular legal provisions can be declared unconsdonable components, just like price
terms, under § 2-302. As Leff complains, neither the statute nor the cases provide an), criteria
for judging whether a clause is an unconscionable one. Leff, supra note 82. at 515-28. In
their absence the general tests of imbalance of the whole contract, unreasonable favoritism
to one party or unnecessary harshness on the other, will have to do. Some contractual
provisions recently found unconscionable include warranty disclaimers, provisions re-
quiring the buyer's submission to a foreign jurisdiction, installment contract repossession
clauses, and waivers of defenses against assignees. Ellinghaus gives a quite thorough dis-
cussion of these, supra note 84, at 793-808. Unconsconability theory is exhibiting a
tendency to swallow up clauses illegal under other provisions of the UCC, those declared
void as against public policy, and those which attempt to allocate rights between the
parties in areas pre-empted by existing statutory or decisional law. Rxamples of situations
where § 2-302 has been used in conjunction with other provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code include Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 447, 240 A_7d
195, 198-199 (1968) (§ 2-316); Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622,
626 (7th Cir. 1969) (§§ 2-718, 2-719); and Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 125, 232 A.2d 405,
418 (1967) (§ 9-206). See Leff, supra note 82, at 517-23; Ellinghaus, supra note 84, at 793-
808. For a list of provisions barred from retail installment sales contracts in various states,
see B. CuRRAN, TwINs IN CONSUMER CREDrr LEGisrATION 312-22 (1965).
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to a black at a price well in excess of the seller's cost and expenses (with
an allowance for reasonable profit) and under the kind of conditions
found in Contract Buyers League contracts. Translated into uncon-
scionability terminology, assume a finder of fact determines that housing
market discrimination creates this specially vulnerable racial class, sub-
jected to economic duress, placed in an inferior bargaining position and
deprived of meaningful choice in a necessity of life (shelter). Assume
also that the price and conditions of the contract are found to be out of
balance, unreasonably favoring the seller and unnecessarily harsh on
the buyer. Is the contract prima facie racially unconscionable? Substan-
tive oppression alone has been sufficient in the past, so it is clear that
if the imbalance is gross enough the contract is unconscionable under
existing commercial law without regard to the dual market. Since the
economic consequences of race are a necessary element3 7 of a racial
unconscionability claim under Section 1982 as embellished by Section
1988, however, the case will not have to rest solely on substantive aspects.
The next question concerns what sort of procedural component is
necessary to prove unconscionability where the substantive imbalance is
large but not gross. Is the predicament of one who is specially disadvan-
taged by the dual housing market, as an economic concomitant of being
black, enough or is some form of seller misbehavior necessary? The
cases under Section 2-302 have said neither that the procedural coin-
ponent must include an element of seller bargaining abuse, nor that
external circumstances alone are insufficient. On the contrary, the fre-
quency with which procedural unconscionability is stated in terms of
lack of meaningful choice or unequal bargaining position rather than
more restrictive phrases suggests that courts do not want to foreclose
their ability to find procedural unconscionability in any set of bargain-
ing circumstances.
The degree of choice-inhibition required seems to be conceived as
roughly inversely proportional to the extent of the substantive oppres-
sion, as Spanogle notes:
In all cases, a sliding scale is used, so that unconscionability may be
found in a severely harsh term although the procedural abuse was
mild, and vice versa.13
8
The "sliding scale" does not run to zero on the substantive end, though.
137. The theme of Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionabilty: A Suiggested
Approach to UCC Section 2-302, supra note 121, is that some showing of unequal bar.
gaining power is always a necessary element of unconsdonability.
138. Spanogle, supra note 85, at 952.
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Comment 1 to Section 2-302 warns against "disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power." Ellinghaus reads this
to mean that-
[Mjere disparity of bargaining strength, without more, is not
enough to make out a case of unconscionability ... [S]ome ele-
ment of deception or substantive unfairness must be shown.130
To summarize, a prima facie case of racial unconscionability against
the seller consists of proof of the racially discriminatory market, the
creation of a specially vulnerable class of blacks, plus some minimum
amount of substantive oppression in the contract terms, depending on
how restrictive the market is proven to be.
Remedies. What kind of affirmative140 relief is available to the victims
of racial unconscionability? The traditional defensive remedy has been
a simple refusal by the court to enforce the contract. A recent New York
decision, Jones v. Star-Credit Corp., indicates that the black buyer may
be granted the remedy sought by the Contract Buyers League plaintiffs
-reformation:
Having already paid more than $600 toward the purchase of this
$300 freezer unit, it is apparent that the defendant has already been
amply compensated. In accordance with the statute (2-.302) the
application of the payment provision should be limited to amounts
already paid by the plaintiffs and the contract be reformed and
amended by changing the payments called for therein to equal the
amount of payment actually so paid by the plaintiffs.141
The difficulty with the Jones v. Star-Credit Corp. reformation is that
it is based on expediency rather than a notion of fair price. The Con-
139. Ellinghaus, supra note 84, at 766-67. The "something-for-cveryone" history of this
clause in Comment I is perused by Leff, supra note 82, at 499-501.
140. Judge Will in his dismissal of the Contract Buyers League state commercial law
count doubted whether a claim of unconscionability could be initiated afirmatively.
Speaking of the Illinois unconscionability cases involving "a disparity in values ex-
changed," he commented:
Mhese rare cases are significantly distinct from the instant case in that the court is
typically being asked to enforce the unconscionable contract; and when the court
refuses, it states as its reason the classic proposition that "rclourts of equity will not
lend their aid to assist one in realizing upon an unconscionable bargain."
300 F. Supp. at 227 (citations omitted). But Pomeroy's statement of the concept of
unconscionability, accepted by the Contract Buyers League court on that same page as
"standard" reads:
MfThese [inequitable] circumstances, combined with inadequacy of price, may easily
induce a court to grant relief, defensive or affirmative.
3 PoNumoy, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDECE § 928, at 641 (5th ed. 1941) (foot-
notes omitted). In fact, courts have already heard affirmative unconscionability
claims and granted relief, even where illegality -was found on the basis of price disparity
alone. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 M isc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S2d 264 (1969).
141. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 193, 298 N.YS.2d 264, 268 (1969).
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tract Buyers League class includes people who have entered into agree-
ments as early as 1952 and as late as 1968.142 There are buyers who
have paid in full or nearly in full, and, assuming final judgment is
reached sometime in the near future there will be buyers who will have
not yet paid in the equivalent of a fair price. The latter group is easy
to relieve-they will still owe the sellers money. In instances where the
seller will have to give back some money in order to achieve the state
of affairs that would have existed if the price had been fair the remedy
of reformation would permit a money judgment, to which the only
obstacle might be collection difficulties.143
IV. The 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Phenomenon of Racial Dis.
crimination in Property
In the previous section, it has been shown that the text of Section
1988 authorizes importation of state and common law commercial in-
juries arising in a distinctly racial setting to define the scope of the
right declared in Section 1982. An additional argument supporting this
142. 300 F. Supp. 210, 213, 223 (N.D. fl1. 1969). It should be noted that § 2-302 provides
a new kind of reformation, based not on mutual mistake nor on an actual meeting of
minds, but on a sort of public policy curbing the unconscionable aspects of a contract.
143. Following the analogy of racial unconscionability, any commercial claim which
includes, as a necessary element of proof, the economic position of a non-white subjected
to racial discrimination or segregation in the relevant market states a cause of action
under § 1982 as fleshed out by § 1988.
Federal and state anti-trust statutes offer lucrative possibilities (both in terms of legal
theory and treble damages). Under the price-fixing charges in Counts II and III of tile
Contract Buyers League complaint, accepted by Judge Will, 300 F. Supp. at 216-18, if the
sellers' power to fix prices is an essential part of the claim and this power existed only
because of the discriminatory market, then the price-fixing injury is necessarily Inflicted
on black people because of their race, and through § 1988, this is a violation of § 1982.
Though it is not alleged in the Contract Buyers League complaint, selling property on
installment contract may involve a tie-in between housing and financing illegal under
antitrust law. See generally Note, Consumers and Antitrust Treble Damages: Credit.
Furniture Tie-ins in the Low Income Market, 79 YAL L.J. 254 (1969). If the unavailability
of housing and mortgage loans for blacks resulting from institutional race discrimination
is the basic premise and precondition for the ghetto seller's refusal to sell on any terms
except the installment land contract, then the injury done by his tie-in is a racial one
and § 1982 applies. One commentator has already recognized the "unilateral" price dis-
crimination achieved by the low-income market (LIM) retailer who ties financing to
furniture sales:
Given both a segregated market and the tying arrangement the LIM retailer is able
to allocate his total price arbitrarily between "furniture price" and "credit price."
Segregation, then, is necessary for the initiation of charge shifting ....
Id. at 260, 264 (citation omitted). Thirdly, if the seller and his savings and loan association
financier agreed that the lender would make no direct loans to purchasers even If a
qualified borrower requested, in order to favor the seller's installment contract sale, thils
not only would be § 1982 traditionally discriminatory action, but as a combination in
restraint of trade made possible by the general unavailability of conventional financing for
blacks it would seem to be a Sherman Act violation based on race which also violates
§ 1982 through § 1988.
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result can be made: the very nature of the right created in Section 1982
requires the breadth such a textual reading allows. Let us consider
again the wording of Section 1982:
All citizens... shall have the same right.., as is enjoyed by
white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property.
The statute does not identify who may be a violator nor does it specify
the conduct for which one may be held liable. In this sense, it is unlike
the 1968 Fair Housing Act, which makes certain acts illegal, such as
"[t]o refuse to sell or rent.., or otherwise make unavailable" housing
because of race and "[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale."' 44 It is also unlike the Fourteenth
Amendment, which makes it unconstitutional for states to "deny to any
person... the equal protection of the laws."1 48i As the Court spells out
in Jones v. Mayer, Section 1982 is closer kin to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, which simply says "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
. . . shall exist within the United States."' 140 That Court stated the
relation between the statute and the amendment: In order to keep the
Thirteenth Amendment's "promise of freedom" Congress "assure[d]
that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as
a dollar in the hands of a white man."'147
For almost a century, Section 1982 had been thought to proscribe
the act of discrimination only when committed through state action.
Jones v. Mayer changed that construction by stating that the terms,
intent and constitutional authority of Section 1982 were properly in-
terpreted as barring "all racial discrimination, private as well as public,
in the sale or rental of property."' 4 8 Just as the courts have come to
acknowledge that Section 1982 does not specify possible violators, they
must soon see that the statute does not specify prohibited acts of dis-
crimination, traditionally defined or otherwise. As the offspring of the
Thirteenth Amendment, as well as by its own terms, Section 1982
guarantees equal property rights between the races in fact. The statute
is addressed to whether the present status of the black man's property
rights is the same as that enjoyed by whites-it is oriented toward the
144. 42 U.S.C. § 3904.
145. U.S. CoNsr., 14th Amend. § 1.
146. US. CoNsr., 13th Amend. § 1; Jones v. Mayer, 392 US. at 437-44.
147. 392 US. at 443; quoted in Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F.
Supp. at 215.
148. 392 U.S. at 413 (emphasis in original).
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situation of the victim of discrimination, not the acts of the discrimi-
nator. Thus, Section 1982 is ultimately dedicated to the eradication of
the effects of discrimination in property disposition.
The general problem, then, is to develop a usable legal principle out
of a broad law which flatly prohibits the existence of racially discrimi-
natory effects. The limits of the implications that can be drawn from
such a theory are hard to define. It may go so far as to impose an affirma-
tive duty upon Congress and state legislatures to cure the effects of
discrimination, as Arthur Kinoy suggests. 149 Our concern here, however,
is with the federal courts' responsibility to develop theories of individual
liability which will fulfill the purposes of Section 1982. Since the judi-
cial application of Section 1982 will be a process of singling out partic-
ular individuals and making them liable for particular acts, courts must
specify offending behavior as carefully and precisely as possible."16 For
Section 1982 to become a workable legal principle, a way must be
found to relate rationally the effects of discrimination to identifiable
acts and the actors causing them.
The potential scope of liability under Section 1982 thus cannot be
ascertained without an understanding of the complex phenomenon of
discrimination in situations involving property rights. Earlier we dis.
cussed how individual acts of traditionally defined racial discrimination
committed by white market restrictors can be connected, through a
chain of events, to the high cost of a ghetto home purchase. The practical
difficulties uncovered in that liability theory suggest the obvious legal
149. Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RtrrcEas L. REv. 387,
439-40 (1967); Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First
Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 22 RuTGERs L. Rav. 537, 542 (1968).
150. Enforcement of § 1982 without the minimum specification of who may be
brought into court would be enforcement by judicial caprice. At the very least one would
expect that upon the judicial proof of a discriminatory phenomenon in one commodity
in an area, housing in Chicago for instance, the court's remedial order would be
directed to those who are in a good position to correct one or more of the aspects of the
phenomenon (e.g., force the FHA to reverse its dual market supportive practices and
allocate low-cost mortgage financing to relieve peo ple struck by the effects of dis.
crimination, such as high-priced installment contracts). But the law must set a stand.
ard clear and precise enough to have the essential quality of due process. A law
which is too vague gives people no "notice" that the courts may interfere with their
lives and surprises them when they have no idea what they should or should not have
done. In Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1925), the Court phrased
this doctrine: "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning or differ as
to its application, violates the first esential of due process." See Cramp v, Board of Ptblic
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An A.
praisal, 40 CoRNELL L. REV. 195 (1955); Amsterdam, The Void.For.Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). Development of § 1982 using state
and common law imported through Section 1988 avoids the vagueness problem by relying
upon existing standards of fault liability.
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limits of its approach: conceiving the phenomenon of discrimination as
a linear process, starting with racial discrimination in the sale of subur-
ban housing, for example, and ending with an exorbitant installment
land sale contract in the ghetto, involves so long a chain of causation
between original act and final effect that recovery for a black contract
homebuyer would be rare indeed.1 l To achieve a more adequate and
comprehensive application of Section 1982, the phenomenon of dis-
crimination must be broken up into three dimensions, each with certain
acts related closely enough to certain racially discriminatory effects so
that legal liability can be attached to them.
First, there is the isolated individual act of treating a person unfavor-
ably because of his race, which has been designated traditional discrimi-
natory action. What this act means in effect for the black man is that
he cannot complete the transaction he wants because he is black.
Secondly, when the society is pervaded with these traditional acts of
selection for differential treatment, from a private homeowner's refusal
to sell to the promulgation of a government agency's biased national
policy, these traditional acts in the aggregate, in combination with other
limitations on the housing stock,'152 unbalanced by alternative sources
of supply, 53 result in white market restriction-the creation and sup-
port of the dual market. When discrimination becomes institutionalized
in this way, we style its effect the creation of the systemic condition of
discrimination. The effect in this "second dimension" is the placement
of the black consumer in a captive market devoid of significant free
choice.
Thus, the potential is created for a third dimension of discrimination
to result. Given the systemic condition of discrimination, other in-
dividuals, though they may not have created the racially dual market,
act to take advantage of it. Those who sell to blacks, if they charge what
the black side of the market will bear, receive a profit inflated by a race
"tax." Upon the specially disadvantaged position of blacks trapped by
the systemic condition of discrimination, social and economic mecha-
nisms operate, though often in a manner not traditionally discrimina-
tory, to misallocate resources-blacks end up with less in the way of
goods and services per dollar spent than do their white counterparts.'"
151. See pp. 528-30 supra.
152. E.g., suburban zoning practices preventing access by low-income people to housing
throughout a metropolitan area.
153. E.g., housing made available by blockbusting or special government financial aid
programs. See note 20 supra.
154. See note 27 supra for a treatment of this dimension as "circular and cumulative
causation."
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This misallocation-and the burdensome effect on the black man which
results-unmistakably has its origins in widespread racial discrimi-
nation.
Once the phenomenon of discrimination is properly analyzed-into
three types of acts with three types of effects-the application of the
1866 Civil Rights Act becomes strikingly dear: Section 1982 provides
the mandate for the federal courts to be active in all three dimensions,
with Section 1988 providing manageable theories of liability for each of
them. Since Section 1982 is directed at the totality of racially dis-
criminatory effects in the disposition of property rights, and at the acts
that produce them, none of the three dimensions of discriminatory
action-traditional individual acts, acts that in the aggregate create a
systemic condition with a clear racial impact, or acts that "take ad-
vantage" of such a systemic condition-are immunized from its prohi-
bition. If it is illegal to commit a discriminatory act-traditionally de-
fined-and thus participate in the creation and maintenance of a dual
market, it should also be illegal to make an "excessively large" profit by
taking advantage of the black man's captive market position. To do so
is to bring an oppressive effect of discrimination down upon him.165
Section 1982 can in practice be enforced against discriminatory action
in each of the three dimensions. The delineation of specific rights flow-
ing from the general right declared by Section 1982 is left to the courts
with the command of Section 1988 to construct whatever federal law is
necessary to achieve the objective of Section 1982. Jones v. Mayer iden-
tified the first such specific right, the traditional right to be free from an
individual's differential treatment on the basis of race. But the Jones v.
Mayer standard of liability is, as we have seen, absolutely useless against
155. judge Will's reading of Jones v. Mayer in Contract Buyers League moves far
toward a realization that § 1982 is directed at the entire phenomenon of discrimination
in property rights, including the systemic condition and excessive profit-taking:
The Court found that the legislative history of the 1866 Act demonstrated the Con-
gressional intent to ensure that the former slaves could participate fully in a
national economy. It was the Court's conclusion that the existence of a black market
distinct from a white market was the de facto vestige of what the Congress in 1866
intended to abolish as a critical means of making the black man a free man. The
conviction recognized was that the obliteration of the social system where one man was
the slave of another required as a fundamental matter that our economy be un-
differentiated as to the race of a man.
Defendants present the discredited claim that it is necessarily right for a businessman
to secure profit wherever profit is available, arguing . .. that they did not create
the system of de facto segregation which was the condition for the alleged discrimina-
tory profit .... [But] it is now understood that under § 1982 as interpreted in Jones
v. Mayer there cannot be markets or profits based on the color of a man's skin.
300 F. Supp. at 215-16.
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illegal conduct operating to take advantage of a systemic condition aris-
ing from initial traditional discrimination practiced in the aggregate.
This fact should not insulate acts of "taking advantage" from liability.
The analysis of racial discrimination as a divisible phenomenon serves to
show that the kinds of behavior found in each of the three dimensions,
though interlocking to form a totality, are so different as to be impossible
to judge by a single rule. Traditional discrimination occupies only a par-
ticular location in a complicated phenomenon. Once this is understood,
it suggests that discriminatory acts vary in their nature depending on
where they fall within the total phenomenon of discrimination. There-
fore, specific rights and rules defining liability must be tailored to those
variations. This is the function for which Section 1988 is designed. And,
as the phenomenon may change over time and grow in sophistication,
Section 1982 will continue to apply, because the flexibility of Section
1988 allows an on-going process of rule-making.
The Supreme Court in Jones v. Mayer was able to imply the tradi-
tional rule against discriminatory action from the text of Section 1982,
but it had to turn to Section 1988 in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park
to make that rule fully enforceable. There is nothing in Section 1982 to
indicate that courts must stop there in defining standards of liability.
Rather, the value of the 1866 Act is that by Section 1988 it authorizes
a court to construct whatever combination of federal, state and common
law will be appropriate to remedy the kind of discriminatory effects at
hand. In identifying reprehensible behavior in the third dimension
-"taking advantage"--we are obviously dealing with the normal
operation of our society's distribution system given the existence of a
dual market. For this reason, commercial standards found in state and
common law are especially appropriate to regulation of action in the
third dimension-development of civil rights law under Section 1988
can parallel familiar standards of ethical commercial conduct. For
instance, racial unconscionability has the desirable characteristic of
building upon an existing, "fault" liability rule.150
156. Still satisfying the legal values of consistency and predictability, a new set of
definitions of the third-dimensional acts incurring liability under § 1982-acts not
tainted with fault under present law-could be developed in an alternative way. The
courts could just hold that the non-white's guarantee of a discrimination.less sodety
imposes a duty on ghetto sellers not to charge more than whites pay for comparable
housing. This is the standard that appears to crop up in judge Wils Conlradt Buyers
League opinion at several points. See note 17 supra.
In a sense, the text of § 1982 referring to "the sam e . . . right as is enjoyed by
white citizens" allows a reading that this means white citizens generally, i.e. in comparable
situations within the white market at large. While this interpretation may be appropriate
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What the concept of racial unconscionability does is link up this
commercial standard with the recognition that the act of taking advan-
tage depends on the existence of the systemic condition of discrimination
-the racially dual market-and carries out its potential to oppress
black homebuyers. In doing so, racial unconscionability demonstrates
how a commercial injury becomes a civil rights cause of action under
Section 1982 when the phenomenon of racial discrimination is analyzed
in three dimensions.
The cause of action can be stated in general form:
If there exists a systemic condition with a distinctly racial im-
pact in the marketplace resulting from the aggregation of tradi-
tionally discriminatory acts and there is taking advantage of this
condition, then an injury may be found under Sections 1982 and
1988 and appropriate imported state and common law.
In order for "taking advantage" to be properly identified as discrimina-
tory, a sufficient factual foundation must be laid in the dimension upon
which the taking advantage depends-the existence of the systemic con.
as a prohibition of the phenomenon of discrimination in general, the duty to follow coin-
parable sales is merely the rote application of a broad statement to a particular ghetto
seller's act.
Section 1982, if it were used this way, would be laying down rules much like strict
liability in tort law as exemplified by workmen's compensation or products liability
under REsTATniENT oF TORTs 2d § 402a. Strict liability has been justified as a valid part
of our jurisprudence because it is based on sound, workable economic principles of
"enterprise liability." That is, certain manufacturers, dealers, and employers can be held
liable without fault for injuries suffered by their consumers and employees because It Is
possible and economically sensible to characterize these losses as risks of their enterprises,
Similarly if § 1982 were interpreted to mean that ghetto sellers must take care lint
to charge more than whites pay for comparable housing, it would be just another enter.
prise responsibility dictated this time by a public policy concept of constitutional stature
the human right to racial equality. This responsibility would, to borrow Judge Will's
phrase, take its place among other "economic bounds and ethical limits of business
enterprise." Contract Buyers League, 500 F. Supp. at 216.
The results of a strict rule would be almost the same as if the sellers had been found
guilty of racial unconscionability, but the price reduction would be imposed as a matter
of public policy rather than liability for fault. The position of such a rule in the
framework of the phenomenon of discrimination is the same as racial unconsdonabillty:
it functions in the "effect" dimension, treats only one symptom of discrimination, leaves
the other dimensions and other effects untouched. Yet in several ways a strict liability
rule is different, perhaps less desirable to use compared to racial unconscionability. These
differences arise from the fact that racial unconscionability is keyed to race by character-
izing the infraction as profiteering off the state of discrimination, while the strict liability
rule aims to rectify the effects of discrimination by equalizing black prices to white levels,
This distinction would be reflected in the relative amounts of relief granted. See pp. 5t4-)5
supra. Application of the strict rule, of course, brazenly assumes that comparable white
sales can be empirically determined. See note 18 supra. Finally, as noted earlier, a standard
based on prices in the white market which the ghetto seller must follow at his peril would
discourage anyone doing business in a black area, while the racial unconscionability stan-
dard only eliminates profits which can be seen, in the setting of the seller's own business,
as collected on the basis of race.
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dition of a racially discriminatory market. For example, in the Contract
Buyers League setting, evidence of a low-income housing shortage is not
enough; there must be proof that individual acts of traditional dis-
crimination in the aggregate produce a net restriction on supply and
quality which is peculiarly directed at the black man. Translated into
racial unconscionability terms, it is inferred from this net restriction
that the black buyer is deprived of bargaining power and meaningful
choice and placed in a specially vulnerable class on account of his race.
Once the strictly racial foundation is laid, the other general problem of
proof is defining the content of "taking advantage." The term generally
comprehends the action of one who uses his superior social or economic
position to confer some benefit on himself by imposing a detriment on
someone else. Racial unconscionability attempts to deal with this pro-
blem by resolving the issue into an evaluation by judge or jury of
whether the seller's planned rate of return on each contract was reason-
able. Certain guidelines as to appropriate time of assessment, allowable
costs and expenses, use of profits, and relevance of credit risk informa-
tion may be developed to aid them.
Distinguishing the three dimensions of discrimination also facilitates
a sketch of the social and economic impact of this newly-fashioned legal
concept. A rule against racial unconscionability functions to minimize
the harsh effects of a systemic condition produced by racial discrimina-
tion, but does so only partially. It remedies the problem of overpricing
suffered by blacks. But it does nothing to discourage traditional acts of
discrimination, and so cannot eliminate the systemic condition of dis-
crimination. Hence all other effects deriving from the existence of the
dual market remain. Housing may become less expensive, but blacks
will still be limited in the areas where they can live and in the quality
of housing available to them. Indeed, the result of a judicially lowered
price only emphasizes the dual market's continued existence. The
"artificially" reduced price is not favorable to profit-motivated tenden-
cies which increase the supply of housing in the black market, such as
blockbusting. Instead, a classic example of rationing takes place: At the
administered (rather than market-determined) price, more blacks want
to purchase homes than the supply can serve, leaving black housing
needs still unsatisfied. Thus, a rule directed against racial unconscion-
ability, despite its practical advantages, treats the symptoms of discrim-
ination only. Legal actions against traditional discriminators, against
the institutional white market restrictors who maintain the systemic
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condition of discrimination-these are in reality much more important
in the sense that they go to the root causes of the phenomenon of dis.
crimination, despite their practical disadvantages.
In the final analysis, thinking about racially discriminatory actions
in three different dimensions should suggest that the problem cannot
be solved by relying on the law of one dimension and ignoring the
other two. The 1866 Civil Rights Act was intended and designed, with
its broad declaration of rights and flexible enforcement clause, to be
a complete legislative package equal to the task. As its sponsor, Senator
Trumbull, phrased it when he asserted the authority of Congress to pass
the 1866 Civil Rights Act: "I have no doubt that under this provision
of the Constitution we may destroy all these discriminations in civil
rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional
amendment amounts to nothing.' 15 7
157. Senator Trumbull, CONG. GLOBE, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 322 (1866).
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